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An abstract of the thesis of Terri Lee Kelly for the Master of Science in Conflict 
Resolution presented June 3, 2002. 
Title: A Critical Review of Issues in Applying Restorative Justice Principles 
and Practices to Cases of Hate Crime. 
A restorative approach to justice focuses on accountability for healing 
the harm done to victims and communities as a result of criminal acts. Hate 
crimes are intended to send a threatening message to a particular group of 
people. There is enough reliable research on restorative justice principles and 
practices, and on the causes, meaning and impact of hate crimes, to bring 
together a representative selection of available literature for a critical review. 
This thesis critically reviews the literature of restorative justice principles and 
practices, and the literature of hate crime causes, definitions, laws, and 
typologies of offenders, using as a model Comstock's seven-step Critical 
Research Method. Findings suggest that congruencies between the two fields 
of study are primarily found in how activities appropriated to define the fields 
have increased the ambiguity of the definitions. Further findings suggest that 
there are important underlying issues of class and power distribution in need 
of attention in both fields of research. These findings are discussed and 
suggestions are made for future areas of research. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
Introduction 
I did not heal by myself. I healed and continue to heal because people 
helped me. I got the best help I could imagine: emergency medical, 
police, legal, and personal. Not only my friends but also people who 
barely knew me and strangers who did not know me at all responded 
with warmth and also with outrage. It is only because of these 
responses that I have managed to heal. The only antidote to the horror 
of the shooting has been the incredible kindness that I have received 
since that time and the realization of the appropriate conclusion to the 
court proceedings (Brenner 184). 
In May, 1988, Claudia Brenner and Rebecca Wight were making love 
by the side of a stream along the Appalachian Trail when they were shot eight 
times. A "mountain man," who the women had seen only once briefly along the 
trail, shot Claudia five times and Rebecca three times. Despite the five 
massive wounds on her face, neck and shoulders, Claudia managed to walk to 
a road and get help. She survived, but Rebecca died only a few minutes after 
the shooting began. 
I read Claudia's account of the day her world "exploded" during the 
period of time that I was training to be a victim-offender mediator. Perhaps it 
was the synchronicity of reading about a hate crime that could have happened 
to me or any of my friends, and absorbing Claudia's words about how she 
healed, while at the same time learning how to bring meaning to face-to-face 
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encounters between victims of crime and their offenders, that made me 
curious about just how effective restorative justice could be in cases of hate 
crime. Claudia said repeatedly in her book that much of her healing had to do 
with an abundant support system and from working towards making sure the 
shooter would "rot in prison" because "his life was worthless" (Brenner 185). 
At the time, I really wanted to believe that restorative justice could have a part 
in healing so great a harm. But I didn't know enough about the causes of hate 
crime to know definitively how effective it could be. And what Claudia Brenner 
had to say was challenging my training on how to balance the needs of both 
victims and offenders. There was also something bothering me about all the 
factors of the crime not discussed in her book -- who was the "mountain man" 
and what was going on in his world that made sense out of shooting lesbians? 
What is the nature of outrage? Why does it seem like there are deeper issues 
at work here - that people don't just wake up one day and decide to be 
murderous homophobes? It was these sorts of moments of feeling that there 
was something else going on, that compelled me to conduct research. 
Brenner's book made it clear that horrible trauma has a deep impact on 
one's life, but that somehow it fosters soulful growth in a way that no other life-
altering event can. I wanted to know why Brenner ended up considering 
herself to be a stronger, more compassionate person after the long arduous 
process of healing form her ordeal. If restorative justice is to have a role in 
such a complex healing process, it will have to address the roles outrage and 
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retribution play while healing. Could it be that restorative justice is helpful for 
only some types of crime, but not for hate crime? Certainly hate crime is a 
different variety of crime than robbery or vandalism--the sorts of crime I was 
used to dealing with in victim-offender mediation. But what made it different? 
Restorative justice is a way to focus on issues of accountability in a personal 
way. Who is accountable for hate crime - just the offender? Should the issue 
of hate even be brought up in a restorative justice action? Are mediators 
qualified to take it on? Is hate the only issue in a hate crime? 
I read Eight Bullets (Brenner) in January 2001, and began reading for 
my thesis in February (though I had been reading material on both subjects -
hate crime and restorative justice - for some months beforehand). I thought it 
was going to take only a few months to read enough material to gain an 
understanding of where restorative justice could "fit" in the schema of hate 
crime. I was wrong. I'm still reading today, more than a year later, but I finally 
felt like I could begin writing a thesis a few months ago. Is there something 
about restorative justice principles and/or practices that can somehow 
contribute to an understanding of why people hate, or at least how to heal the 
harm done by hatred? I considered my job to be about separating the 
ominous questions into smaller, more manageable questions in order to find 
congruencies in the details. Some of those questions are: 
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• What are the causes of hate? 
• How do we define a hate crime? 
• How do we define restorative justice? 
• What do the laws say and who makes the laws? 
• What does it mean to "do" restorative justice? 
• Are there deeper issues at work? 
These are a few of the many questions that came up for me as I 
conducted my research, but they were the most plausible candidates for 
finding an abundance of literature. I took the "sponge" approach to my 
research - I saturated my brain with literature until I could begin to see how 
some things went with other things, and other things I had assumed would go 
together actually did not. I also immersed myself in experiential learning, by 
participating in victim-offender mediation and also completing an intense 
training in "Severe Violence Dialogue" - the form of mediation that would be 
most appropriate for a case so described in Eight Bullets. 
The thesis is arranged by chapters. The two chapters after this one are 
brief histories of the issues under study: hate crimes and restorative justice. 
The fourth chapter explains the methodology I used to unravel some of the 
complexity of these issues. The middle section of the thesis is comprised of 
the critical literature review - the heart of the thesis, because it is while 
accomplishing this review that I was able to see some of those "deeper 
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issues" that made all the difference in the outcome. Then there is a chapter 
where I flesh out those deeper issues from the review -- where the 
congruencies and contradictions are revealed. The last chapter is a conclusion 
where I remember what I started out to do, and reflect on the journey. 
There is so much to learn about both issues. I have only scratched the 
surface. I hope someone will go on from here, finding answers to some of the 
real tough questions this thesis brings up. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
A Brief History of Hate 
Hate-motivated violence has been with us since the beginning of 
civilization. Violence organized around social characteristics and affiliation (or 
perceived affiliation) with a group is well-documented for atrocities such as 
the WWII Holocaust, the lynching of African-Americans in the U.S. (Bensinger; 
Kresse!; Lutz; Newton and Newton), the more recent ethnic cleansing in the 
Balkans, and crimes spurred by the September 11, 2001, attack in the U.S. 
From 1882 to 1968, nearly 5,000 African-Americans were lynched in the U.S. 
(Jacobs and Potter, Hate Crimes 60). Violence against gay men and lesbians 
in Western Europe over the last 400 years has been documented (Boswell; 
Katz). Historically, such violence was often present as official state policy, 
perpetrated by representatives of the state, as well as private citizens. The 
pervasiveness of religious, ethnic, and racial violence eventually led to the 
creation of metropolitan police departments (Friedman 105-107). In the early 
1980s, activists demanded that U.S. lawmakers enact measures to control the 
escalation of hate-motivated intimidation and violence. As a result, a new 
category of crime emerged: the "hate crime" (Bensinger; Jacobs and Potter; 
Grattet and Jenness; Jenness and Grattet). 
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The white supremacist movement is usuaUy cited as a forerunner of all 
contemporary hate groups. The Ku Klux Klan, historically the most influential 
white supremacist organization in the U.S., was founded in 1865, as a 
fraternal order for Civil War veterans of the confederate states. After a brief 
hiatus, the Klan reemerged in 1915, expanding its membership to between 
four and five million by 1925 (Blee, Women of the Klan 18). The American 
Nazi Party was founded in 1958 by George Lincoln Rockwell to honor the 
legacy of Adolph Hitler. The civil rights movements of the 1950s and 1960s 
triggered the next wave of interest in the Klan. Many contemporary neo-Nazi 
organizations are their direct descendants (Ferber; Blee, Racism) .. There are 
a wide variety of white supremacy organizations today, including various Klan 
groups, skinheads, the neo-Nazi National Alliance, the National Socialist White 
People's Party, and the Posse Comitatus (Ferber). The white supremacist 
movement of the 1980s gave birth to the militia movement, which has, in some 
comers, grown increasingly racist and anti-Semitic (Blee, Racism). 
During the fist half of the 20th century, criminalization of hate speech, 
such as bigoted expressions or symbols, was popular among U.S. lawmakers. 
In Beauhamais v. Illinois (1952), the U.S. Supreme Court affirmed a state law 
that punished hate speech against racial, religious, or ethnic groups (B. Levin, 
Hate Crimes 10).1 However, the public criminalization of hate did not always 
mean that justice was done. In the early 1980s, two high school seniors in 
Washington D.C. were sentenced to perform community service rather than 
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serve prison time after nearly beating to death a gay man (Herek and Berrill 
280). In another case, Texas judge Jack Hampton excused his light 
sentencing of the murderer of two gay men by stating, "I put prostitutes and 
queers at the same level. .. and I'd be hard put to give somebody life for killing 
a prostitute." (294). In 1986, the Catholic Church denounced "violent malice in 
speech or in action" against gays, but then went on to blame such malice on 
the gay rights movement: 
When civil legislation is introduced to protect behavior to which no one 
has any conceivable right, neither the Church nor society at large 
should be surprised when other distorted notions and practices gain 
ground and irrational and violent reactions increase."2 
A city council member from Wilkes-Barre--a small city in Pennsylvania, 
near the site of the Wight/Brenner shootings--is quoted as saying that half of 
all gays should be shot and that AIDS is just what gay people deserve (295). A 
Broward County, Florida, Circuit Judge jokingly asks the prosecuting attorney 
in a 1988 case involving the beating death of an Asian-American gay man, 
"That's a crime now, to beat up a homosexual?" (295). 
These are examples of incidents that led researchers to begin 
documenting, as an academic discipline, the history of hate crime and its 
impact on all levels of society. 
Some of the most recent research conducted on the issue of hate crime 
has emphasized the impact on victims. Research by The Prejudice Institute 
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(Ehrlich et al) found that the targets of criminal and non-criminal bias attacks 
experienced 21 % more adverse psychological and physiological symptoms 
than those who faced similar conduct that was not bias related (65). Another 
study by the same group found that "many victims fear for their safety and for 
their family's safety ... many of them report changes in their lifestyle - where 
they walk, how they answer the phone, and [that] the ... fear can totally disrupt 
their lives" (63). A more recent study concluded that hate crime victims 
suffered heightened and more prolonged bouts of "depression, stress, and 
anger than victims" of non-hate crimes. The report further concluded that hate 
crime victims "continued to have symptoms for as long as five years after their 
victimization," while crime-related psychological symptoms declined 
significantly among victims of non-bias crimes within two years of the incident 
(APA). 
The effects of hate crimes reverberate beyond individual victims, 
causing measurable injury to the community at large. Public injury is a 
traditional justification for punishing crime (B. Levin, Hate Crimes 18). 3 The 
two most serious threats to the public resulting from hate crimes is a 
heightened tension between groups that are already hyper-vigilant, and an 
increased risk of civil disorder. These threats are more pronounced with hate 
crimes than with non-hate crimes (19). Hate crimes also may spur retaliatory 
violence (20). After the racially-motivated murder of an African-American man 
in Howard Beach, Queens, in 1986, the New York City Police Department 
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documented more hate crimes in the month that followed than in the previous 
three months combined (10). 
Most recently the public has felt the effects of the dragging murder of 
James Byrd by admittedly racist assailants in Jasper, Texas, and the brutal 
murder of Matthew Shepherd, a gay Wyoming college student who was tied to 
a wooden fencepost, beaten, and left to die. These crimes stand out as 
national tragedies, rather than just horrible local events. Each atrocity not only 
shocks the country, it sends out a threat to all racial, ethnic, or sexual 
minorities that, even today, they are at a special risk for horrible violence and 
death, no matter where they are or what they are doing. 
Notes 
1 Although never technically overturned, subsequent Supreme Court decisions have clearly 
rejected all the foundational arguments of the case, and it is no longer regarded as sound law. 
Levin cites as evidence Texas v. Johnson, 1989 (offensiveness is insufficient basis to punish 
speech), and Smith v. Collin, 1978 (Supreme Court refuses to deny order of Court of Appeals 
allowing a Nazi march). 
2 Vatican Statement, "Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith" (1986). 
3 Levin cites Coker v. Georgia (1977), when the Supreme Court found the death penalty 
unconstitutional for the crime of rape, citing racial discrimination. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
A Brief History of Justice 
Accounts of conceptions of restorative justice claim roots in both 
Western and non-Western traditions. Some advocates claim restorative justice 
has been the dominant model of criminal justice throughout most of human 
history for all the worlds' people (Galaway and Hudson 1; Braithwaite, Crime; 
Strong and Van Ness; Zehr, Lenses). A move towards a restorative model of 
justice is often interpreted as "a return to the roots of justice" (Davis 1-2; 
Llewellyn and Howse). 1 The dominant approach to justice has been described 
as "community and victim-centered justice" in aboriginal cultures and in early 
civilizations (Bianchi). For example, one traditional Navajo justice ceremony is 
called Hozhooji Naat'aanii. The term refers to talking and planning to restore 
damaged relationships, guided by a wise elder. This is referred to as "Justice 
and Harmony Ceremony," or a healing ceremony incorporating rituals of 
prayer, self-expression, dialogue, reconciliation, and consensus (Yazzi 10). 
In late 11th century Europe, new laws were studied by scholars in the 
Catholic Church and disseminated throughout the Western world. The Church 
dealt harshly with its religious heretics, and so the secular states began to 
follow the lead by calling its social heretics "criminals" and meting out 
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punishment accordingly. ''Victims" were no longer considered the actual 
individual victims -- crimes came to be recognized as inflicted upon the King 
and Queen themselves, which eventually evolved into "crimes against The 
State" (Haley 9). The state began, as a criminologist said provocatively this 
century, to "steal the criminal conflict from the community" (Christie, Limits 
93). In the U.S., it is still a shock for some victims to discover that they are not 
even named in court, having been displaced by the ambiguous "We the 
People" as written in the U.S. Constitution (Haley 10). The purpose of the law 
also shifted. Earlier, the emphasis had been upon making the victim whole 
again, what in the ancient Hebrew culture was called "restoring shalom." Later, 
the purpose became to uphold the authority of the state (12). There evolved a 
dominant Western religious emphasis upon the offender's violation of the law, 
which eventually overshadowed concern for the victim. It also drew on Roman 
slave law as a model for punishing the offender. This form of response to 
crime is now regarded as "retributive justice" and has dominated Western 
jurisprudence for a millennium (18). 
The Quakers tried in 1790, in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, to move 
away from the retributive model towards an emphasis upon reforming the 
criminal. They thought the offender might become "penitent" if they were each 
locked up by themselves for years with only a bible for company (Foucault 28). 
The new name for this form of response to crime was the penitentiary (29). 
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The new motive was rehabilitation, not retribution. The idea caught on and 
spread, but an unfortunate side effect began to arise: the dreadful loneliness 
and silence drove offenders stark-raving mad. The penitentiary destroyed the 
very psyche of the convicted criminal (35). 
Restorative justice is a distinctively different model from any retributive 
or rehabilitative approach that treats people not as social beings but as objects 
to manipulate (Walgrave 230). Since the 1970s, as dissatisfaction with the 
traditional justice system mounted regarding its handling of crime, restorative 
justice emerged as an alternative process for addressing the impact of crime 
on both victims and offenders. Until that time, there was general concern that 
victims' needs were too often compromised by an impersonal judicial system 
that still focused on procedures over people. When victims were required to 
attend court, they were often made to feel that they were there only as 
evidence for the case against the defendant(s). Meanwhile, offenders were 
placed in a passive role while the professionals (lawyers, judges, 
investigators) took control of the conflict and directed the process of 
measuring justice and retribution. 
Then in 197 4, two youths who had been drinking and who had already 
had run-ins with police, took out their frustrations on the small community of 
Elmira, Ontario, Canada, by vandalizing 22 vehicles and homes. Several 
months later the youths pleaded guilty to the charges. Probation Officer Mark 
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Yantzi, probably influenced by several discussions he'd had with local 
Mennonite peacemakers regarding the need for judicial reforms, proposed in 
his Pre-Sentence Report that the youths would benefit from meeting face-to-
face with their victims and making amends. The Judge saw merit in the 
proposal, and made a fateful choice to put off sentencing until Yantzi and 
Mennonite volunteer Dave Worth could take the youths to meet each of the 
victims. They did, and out of that experience arose the first ever "victim 
offender reconciliation project" (Peachey). 
It was an American psychologist, Albert Eglash, in 1975, who first used 
the term restorative justice to describe various processes of informal justice in 
existence at that time, such as the Elmira Case. Eglash identified three types 
of criminal justice: retributive justice based on punishment; distributive justice 
based on therapeutic treatment of offenders; and restorative justice based on 
the overall impact of the crime (43). Restorative justice focuses on the harmful 
effects of offenders' actions and actively involves victims and offenders in the 
process (53). From this premise arose a number of American and Canadian 
Victim-Offender Reconciliation Programs (VORPs). These programs bring 
victims and offenders together to meet with a mediator and talk with each 
other. Both sides had an opportunity to express their experience, thoughts and 
feelings. The parties can also negotiate their own way to "make things right." 
(Zehr, VORPs 4). 
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This history briefly summarizes the evolution of the criminal justice 
system in the West away from community and victim-centered justice and 
towards state and offender-centered justice. Other efforts apart from what was 
generally known as "restorative justice" have nevertheless recently become 
included in the generalization of the term. Efforts for public reparations and 
apologies for wide-scale atrocities also focus on healing the harm done. "Truth 
& Reconciliation Commissions" investigate crimes against humanity, 
compensate victims, issue reparations and try to reconcile divided peoples 
after large scale genocidal atrocities. South Africa, which created its first Truth 
and Reconciliation Commission after apartheid, hoped that confronting murder 
and torture would somehow help to heal the harm done on a mass scale 
(Yamamoto, von Truensee). These commissions are a step toward addressing 
harms done across cultures and liberating the future from the past. Argentina 
convened a truth commission in 1983, followed by Uruguay, Chad, Chile, El 
Salvador, Chile and Germany. The value of truth commissions is gaining 
recognition due to the increased global focus on human rights (von 
Struensee). 
The Vatican's long awaited Holocaust document calling for repentance 
for those who had not acknowledged the evil of Jewish genocide, as well 
President Clinton's African apology for the American participation in the slave 
trade, and other efforts to mediate conflicts are all part of a growing interest in 
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reconciliation and forgiveness in the context of political and interpersonal 
violence (Hohri 25). Yet, refusal and denial by political leaders as well as 
private citizens to be truthful about past events, on intrapersonal, 
interpersonal, national and global levels is still pervasive (26). 
Notes 
1 Recent criticism argues that this claim as fact is baseless. See Kathleen Daly, "Restorative 




Exploratory research is conducted into an issue or problem where there 
are few or no earlier studies to refer to. That certainly goes for this review, as 
there appears to be little or no documented connection between restorative 
justice theory and hate crimes research. Therefore, this review is necessarily 
qualitative, due to its inductive, prescriptive, and exploratory nature. Bogdan 
and Biklen described qualitative methods as: 
" ... an umbrella term to refer to several research strategies that share 
certain characteristics. The data collected have been termed soft, that 
is, rich in description of people, places and conversations, and not 
easily handled by statistical procedures. Research questions are not 
framed by operationalizing variables; rather, they are formulated to 
investigate topics in all their complexity, in context." (2) 
Marshall and Rossman suggest the link between qualitative and 
exploratory methods, particularly in cases where the phenomenon "unfolds at 
the time of the study" ( 17). McClure and Lopata further argue for a strong link 
between exploratory research and qualitative methods: 
"Qualitative techniques are especially appropriate for use in situations 
where the research problem and the research setting are not well 
understood ... When it is not clear what questions should be asked or 
what should be measured, a qualitative approach will be more useful." 
(11) 
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Since my review explores issues that are both "not well understood" and that 
are "unfolding at the time of the study," an exploratory focus is appropriate. 
One approach is to perform a critical review of literature for the purpose of 
developing new conceptual frameworks within which any given class of values 
may be more faithfully and fully represented (Wicker 1094). Wicker proposes 
four strategies for expanding conceptual frameworks: 
(1) play with ideas 
(2) consider contexts 
(3) tinker with assumptions 
(4) clarify and systematize the conceptual framework (1095). 
New frameworks can also emerge by integrating and combining 
existing frameworks in revealing ways. A good example would be recent 
efforts to combine the frameworks of economics and psychology to better 
understand green values (Peterson et al). Frameworks are not necessarily 
unbiased. Frameworks can implicitly or explicitly assume a set of values. It 
may even be that the intention for the emerging framework is to emphasize 
and foster a particular set of values (Wicker 1101 ). Exposure to a wider range 
of frameworks will help researchers better understand the frameworks and 
perspectives that others might bring to the table. From such shared 
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understandings may come some new frameworks capable of embracing a 
wider range of perspectives and values. 
Conceptual frameworks help to organize and structure the process of 
defining problems, gathering information, identifying and evaluating 
alternatives, and making decisions. It is the intention of this review to reveal 
values important to the evolution of a conceptual framework that would include 
restorative justice in a resolution for hate crimes. Toward that goal, this review 
follows Comstock's model of inquiry in order to assist in the development of a 
progressive framework for future researchers of restorative justice and hate 
crimes. 
Comstock's model differs from that of the more traditional Positive 
Social Science method in subtle but significant ways (see Table 1). The aim of 
this method is to continually broaden and deepen the participants' awareness 
of the meaning and probable outcome of a course of action: 
The aim is the subjects' progressive movement toward an 
understanding of the totality of historical circumstances that affect 
them .... Its aim is enlightened self-knowledge and effective political 
action. Its method is dialogue, and its effect is to heighten its subjects' 
self-awareness of their collective potential as the active agents of 
history (Comstock, Red Feather). 
Critical research of this sort links social processes to its subjects' choices and 
actions with the goal of eliminating unrecognized and contradictory 
consequences of collective action. 1 
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Table 1. Steps in Research Methods of Positive & Critical Social Sciences (Comstock) 
Positive Social Science J Critical Social Science 
r1~1ci;~tify a scientific problem by studying the [ 1. Identify social groups or movements 
I results of past empirical and theoretical work. I whose interests are progressive. ____ , 
! 2. Develop empirically testable hypotheses j 2. Dev_elop an _int~rpretive ~nderstanding 
I whi~h p~omise ~o im~~ot~e the theory1 s I ~~~h~~~~:~u~~~~t~ye a~~~~~nissinv~~~es, 
j exp ana ory an pre 1c 1ve power. I setting. 
---·-------~-----·····---~-------· 
1 3 s 1 t tt· ( .t I 3. Study the historical development of the , . e ec a se mg commum y, group, · 1 dT d th t · I 
j or~ant~zfiation,bel tc.) which is suitable to the JI ~~~~tu~~~ t~~n~0~;traine acc~r~~~ :~~ia 
1 sc1en 1 1c pro em. . I shape understandings. 
4. Develop measures and data-gathering 
strategies based on: 
Previous research 
Observations and interviews in the setting 
The investigator's own "common-sense" 
Knowledge of social processes 
,-
I 
5. Gather data through: 
Experiments 
Existing documents and texts 
Surveys and interviews 
Observations 
4. Construct models of the relations 
between social conditions, intersubjective 
interpretations of those conditions, and 
participants' actions 
I 5. Elucidate the fundamental 
contradictions which are developing as a 
result of actions based on ideologically 
frozen understandings. 
Compare conditions with understandings 
Critique the ideology 
I 
I 
i Discover immanent possibilities for action -------1 .--------------------' 
6. Analyze data to test the truth value of these 
hypotheses. 
Discard all those hypotheses which do not 
reach .05 degree of probability. 
7. Alter social laws and social theory in light of 
findings and restate scientific problem to be 
addressed by subsequent research. 
---·-·------·------------
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6. Participate in a program of education 
with the subjects that gives them new 
ways of seeing their situation. 
I 
·---------' 
7. Participate in a theoretically grounded I 
program of action which will change social I 
conditions and will also engender new, I 
less alienated, understandings and needs. I 
My research began with a broad reading of the literature on hate crimes 
and on restorative justice for more than a year. I also read material regarding 
victim and offender experiences. Then I selected a range of articles and books 
that appeared to best represent the material I found in the broader 
examination, on the basis that they were the most often cited. I organized this 
selection into sections for a critical literature review, and noted congruencies 
of principles, goals, and standards as I reviewed. I followed Comstock's 
seven-step critical research method (Table 1, 2nd column) inductively, to 
integrate congruencies holistically into a shared set of considerations for any 
future framework that would bring restorative justice principles and practices to 
the social problem of hate-motivated violence. The result is an holistic 
narrative framework for the benefit of future research. 
In my thesis chapters that outline the histories of restorative justice and 
hate crimes, I aimed to fulfill Comstock's steps one and three. In the literature 
review, I aimed to fulfill steps two and four. In the chapter on "Findings" I 
aimed to fulfill steps five and six. In the conclusion, I aimed for step seven. 
Individual methodological concerns that arose in the critical literature review 
are detailed in the introductory segments of each review section. 
Notes 
1 Comstock often cites Ake Sandberg, The Limits to Democratic Planning. Stockholm: Uber 
Forlag, 1976, as a basis for his model. 
21 
CHAPTER FIVE 
Causes of Hate 
Research on causes of hate crimes often refers to literature about the 
function and nature of prejudice itself, since a hate crime can be said to be the 
result of what lies at the extreme end of a scale that has at the other end a 
benign basic human propensity to play favorites. Jack Levin has written a 
seminal work about this subject and is often cited. In his book The Functions 
of Prejudice, Levin explains that prejudice is a learned part of human nature 
and serves important psychological functions. A working definition of prejudice 
from a psychological view is "a negative attitude toward the members of a 
minority group" (13). 1 Prejudices serve individual psychological functions such 
as displacing aggression, protecting self-esteem, reducing uncertainty, and 
positive social functions such as the maintenance of occupational status, the 
performance of unpleasant or low-paying jobs, and the maintenance of power 
structures (36). Overall, prejudice serves to maintain solidarity, and reduce 
competition and uncertainty in a given society (36). 
Another oft-cited work regarding the causes of prejudice is The Nature 
of Prejudice. In his book, the late Harvard psychologist Gordon Allport 
analyzed prejudice to find out something about its nature by studying its 
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interpersonal and societal dynamics. One interesting finding that has 
relevance for this thesis is there are two kinds of prejudice - hate-prejudice 
and love-prejudice. With hate-prejudice, the hater wants the object of his hate 
eliminated. Love-prejudice is "the tendency to over-generalize our categories 
of attachment and affection" (25) such as when a person argues for affirming 
their way of life, or by stating they are pro-white, not anti-black. It is a way to 
defend one's position, privileges, and self-interest. They do not necessarily 
want to actively eliminate the object of their prejudice, they simply do not 
acknowledge their status as having any relevance to their own group. 
Allport argues that a majority of people have contrary impulses about 
their own prejudices. On one hand, they recognize they have prejudices and 
are likely to defend them, and on the other hand, they recognize that 
prejudices are morally distasteful and they are ashamed of them. Then Allport 
looks at how people handle these contrary impulses and finds that 
"psychologically speaking, there seems to be four modes" (334) of how the 
conflict is handled. 
1) Repression (denial). "We don't have a racism problem in our town ... " "I am 
not prejudiced but..." Sometimes it's because people think there's no problem 
as long as there is no overt violence. What they're really saying is "We don't 
have a riot problem here." Or they may be so used to collectively reinforced 
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prejudices that they regard them as normal. Also, to deny that a problem 
exists is to put off the turmoil that will be caused by facing the problem (334). 
2) Defensive Rationalizations. "The most obvious way to preserve one's 
prejudices, and keep them from conflicting with ethical values, is to cite 
'evidence' in their favor. This 'evidence' is made stronger through selective 
perception and selective forgetting, and by giving an "impression of 
universality" leading to assertions such as one made by a student in Allport's 
study: "There seems to be a unanimous feeling against the Jews, not only in 
this country, but throughout the world" (335). 
3) Compromise Solutions. An unfortunate fact of social life is that the many 
roles a man has to play in his life compels him into inconsistent behavior. We 
are not only permitted to contradict ourselves but are encouraged to do so-
depending on the situation. A white shop owner in the South may feel 
compelled by his social role and status in the neighborhood not to hire blacks 
in his store, but he also is compelled by the same forces to donate generously 
to the building of a black hospital. 'We cannot say that such inconsistency in 
behavior is abnormal. Indeed, it is the rigid consistency of the fanatic (whether 
of a bigot or a crusader for equal rights) that is regarded as pathological in our 
society" (337).2 One of the most common ways of handling the inner conflict 
caused by these inconsistencies is to alternate between prejudices and 
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ethics. Since most people have both prejudiced attitudes and a personal 
values system, they avoid being overwhelmed by the conflict by expressing 
one or the other at various times depending on the situation. 
For example, in a report by John B. Stevens, Jr., prosecutor in the trials 
of two of the men who were handed the death penalty for the bias-motivated 
murder of James Byrd in Jasper, Texas, Stevens notes how the people of 
Jasper don't consider their town to be a racist town - there are backs on the 
city council and school board and they have a black mayor. However, "it did 
not go unnoticed by members of the press that a cemetery in Jasper had a 
fence which separated the graves of whites and blacks. "3 
Most influential in our decisions of which value system to use is the fact 
that we are compelled to play multiple roles in our lives. The pressure on us to 
conform in contradictory ways is great. In certain situations we are one thing, 
in other situations, something else. "To be a conformist under diverse sets of 
conditions is almost unavoidably to compromise one's integrity as a person" 
(Allport 338). 
4) Integration. There are those who consider this inconsistency of their role 
behavior as a threat to their integrity. The inconsistencies should not be so 
critical that they splinter one's basic value system. Those who want integration 
wish to face their prejudices and ethics and put them all "under the dominance 
of a wholly consistent philosophy of human relationships" (338). This striving 
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for wholeness and maturity requires a consistency that is extremely hard to 
achieve (338).4 They accomplish this by first discriminating between "fanciful 
sources of evil (prejudice) and genuine sources" (338). The delusions of 
scapegoats who have nothing to do with one's troubles disappear in an 
integrated personality. Resentments and hatreds are then directed strictly at 
those who actually threaten basic value systems (339). 
To put the matter another way, we may say that anger is an emotion, 
whereas hatred must be classified as a sentiment --an enduring 
organization of aggressive impulses toward a person or toward a class 
of persons. Since it is composed of habitual bitter feeling and 
accusatory thought, it constitutes a stubborn structure in the mental-
emotional life of the individual. And since it makes for social disruption, 
and is condemned by religion, it has a strong ethical tinge, though the 
hater usually manages to avoid conflict about the matter. By its very 
nature hatred is extro-punitive, which means that the hater is sure that 
the fault lies in the object of his hate. So long as he believes this he will 
not feel guilty for his uncharitable state of mind [italics mine] (363). 
How do these basic human prejudices progress to the explosion of hate 
crimes at the extreme end of the scale? In his essay, entitled appropriately 
"Causes of Prejudice," Aronson summarizes four themes of theories of 
causes: (1) economic and political competition or conflict, (2) displaced 
aggression, (3) personality needs, and (4) conformity to existing social norms 
(Aronson 128). According to the first theory, if there are limited resources, the 
dominant group may exploit a minority group in order to gain an economic 
and/or political advantage (128). Prejudice then carries more weight when 
balanced against one's basic values, since survival is a basic value. This has 
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been a popular basis for social engineering programs since the 1960s. 
However, there is reason to believe that it doesn't wash in practice. 
An experiment was carried out by Muzafer Sherif' and his colleagues to 
test this theory. Sherif randomly assigned 12-year-old boys to two groups at a 
Boy Scout camp. Within each group the boys were taught to cooperate. After 
they were all getting along well and peaceably with members of their particular 
group, Sherif set up a series of competitive activities to pit each group against 
each other, with prizes awarded to the winning group. There were also 
situations set up to disrupt the balance of fairness in the distribution of food. 
As predicted, these conflicts and disruptions resulted in name-calling and 
food-throwing between members of each group, "and within a very short time 
a full-scale riot was in progress" (Aronson qtd. in Baird 131). Then Sherif 
eliminated the staged conflicts and initiated non-competitive social contact 
between the boys. But to the surprise of all, this did not end the hostilities ... in 
fact, hostilities escalated, even when the boys were engaged in benign 
activities like sitting around watching TV. (131) Sherif did eventually succeed 
at reducing the hostilities. Exactly how will be discussed later in this thesis. 
Sociologist Randy Blazak attributes the rise in skinhead activity in the 
late 1980s and early 1990s in part to forces of economics, but with additional 
criteria that contributes to the political side of this cause. In Blazak's 1995 
ethnographic study of skinheads he found that the rise is also influenced by 
"[t]he patriarchal reaction" or "the new power of women and homosexuals 
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[threatening] many men who clung to traditional definitions of masculinity" 
(Wooden & Blazak 151, Blazak Ethnographic study). 
The scapegoat theory of prejudice makes the point that aggression is 
caused by a multi-faceted glob of frustration, pain, and boredom that, together, 
is "too big or too vague for direct retaliation." (Aronson 132) This unpleasant 
glob took a long time to form, which increases the probability that the globee 
will take it out on a less powerful member of society. The unpleasantness may 
even have been in part caused by aggression directed at the globee by 
members of the less powerful group who will now become the target. It may 
prove impossible for the frustrated individual to return the aggression to the 
very same person or people who hurt him/her, so the most available target is 
any member of the same group. This theory makes a little more sense than 
the competition theory when considering reasons behind the lynching of 
blacks or the Holocaust---situations which don't easily reduce down to strictly a 
matter of economics. 
The prejudiced personality theory is a natural extension of the 
scapegoat theory, in that it explains why there are some frustrated people who 
will decide to commit hate crimes against the scapegoat, and some who will 
not. The difference is a predisposition to traverse to the extreme end of the 
scale. These personalities tend to be authoritarian, rigid in their beliefs, 
intolerant of weakness, and highly punitive, among other identifying 
characteristics ( 134). 
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Finally, the conformity theory arises from anomalies in what would 
expected to occur based on the other theories. For example, it was found that, 
in 1942, 56 percent of all northerners and only 4 percent of all southerners 
were in favor of desegregation, at a time when northerners were experiencing 
more economic competition and southerners experiencing less. (136) In 
addition, although there is more prejudice against blacks in the South, there is 
less prejudice against Jews in the South than there is in the nation as a whole 
(136). So, these and other similar anomalies through the years are not 
congruent with economic or scapegoat theories. 
Thomas Pettigrew suggests that the reason for these anomalies is 
conformity.6 People are simply conforming to the norms that exist in their 
society. "The historical events of the South set the stage for greater prejudice 
against blacks, but it is conformity that keeps it going" (Aronson 136). A study 
of interracial tension in South Africa7 showed that those who were most likely 
to conform to a variety of social norms were also more likely to show a higher 
degree of prejudice (137). Hatred and prejudice may be sparked by economic 
hardship, frustration, displacement, or personality disorder, but the wind that 
fans the flames into an explosion of hate crime is the pressure to conform. 
Blazak offers another critical theory that incorporates most of the 
themes above, but that also focuses on how all these pressures work together 
to put potential hate crime offenders into a state of "normlessness." (Blazak, 
White Boys 986): 
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Existing as a sense of "normlessness" or as a disjunction between 
aspirations and expectations, this state is reflected in a form of 
psychological distress or strain. Whether it is Agnew's (1992) general 
strain theory or Messner and Rosenfeld's (1994) institutional anomie 
theory, the human face of strain is the same: frustration, anger, and a 
need to resolve some perceived inequity (986).8 
Finn and McNeil agree that economic competition by minorities is an 
aggravating factor in some attacks, which may be a partial explanation of the 
vandalism and arson directed toward the seemingly unrelated Korean-owned 
businesses during the 1992 post-Rodney King verdict rioting in Los Angeles. 
Howard J. Ehrlich further expounds " .. that three basic threats evoke a violent 
response: violations of territory or property, violations of the sacred, and 
violations of status ... the victim's behavior or potential behavior is defined by 
the actor as leaving no choice but to respond with violence" (Ehrlich qtd. in 
Herek and Berrill 108-109). The victims may "perceive their offenders as 
representative of the dominant culture in society and an agent of that culture's 
stereotyping of the victim's culture" (Young 19). 
Finally, a recent study by Carolyn Petrosino found five distinct causes 
of hate crime based on a comparative analysis of historical data dating back to 
17th century America (Petrosino). "The distillation of conditions surrounding 
hate crime dynamics both past and present, along with the examination of 
current trends suggest the following summary factors: 
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(a) racism is a primary predictor of hate crime through time; (b) the 
efficiency and degree of harm potential in hate crime is a function of 
opportunity and technology; (c) hate crimes will occur more frequently 
and be more difficult to prevent; (d) notwithstanding the repugnant 
nature of hate crime, many Americans are becoming more sympathetic 
to the hate crime perpetrator's cause; and (e) hate crime, on some 
levels, is becoming indistinguishable from domestic terrorism" 
(abstract). 
These findings demonstrate the urgency needed to find solutions to the 
problem of hate crime in the United States. 
Notes 
1 Also see Howard J. Ehrlich's The Social Psychology of Prejudice (New York: Wiley, 1973); 
and Bernard M. Kramer's "Dimensions of Prejudice," The Journal of Psychology 27 (1949): 
389-451. 
2 Italics mine. The similarities in the definitions of a fanatic and the "integrated" individual who 
has overcome their prejudices will be discussed in my findings. 
3 This is from an unpublished report handed out to conference attendees at the Oregon Hate 
Crimes Conference in Eugene, Oregon in February, 2001. It is entitled "Hate Crimes" by John 
B. Stevens, Assistant United States Attorney for the Eastern District of Texas. He was the 
chief federal prosecutor in the 1998 trials of two of the men who were handed the death 
penalty for their major roles in Byrd's bias-motivated murder. Stevens also notes that after the 
trial, the cemetery fence was taken down. 
4 Italics mine. The similarities in the definitions of a fanatic and the "integrated" individual who 
has overcome their prejudices will be discussed in my findings. 
5 Aronson refers to M. Sherif, O.J. Harvey, B.J. White, W. Hood, and C. Sherif. Intergroup 
Conflict and Cooperation: The Robbers Cave Experiment. Norman: University of Oklahoma 
Institute of Intergroup Relations, 1961. 
6 Aronson cites T.F. Pettigrew. "Regional Differences in Anti-Negro Prejudice." Journal of 
Abnormal and Social Psychology 59 (1959): 28-36. 
7 Aronson cites Pettigrew, "Personality and Sociocultural Factors and Intergroup Attitudes: A 
Cross-national Comparison." Journal of Conflict Resolution 2 (1958): 29-42. 
8 Blazak cites Agnew, R. "Foundations for a general strain theory of crime and delinquency." 
Criminology 30, 1992:47-87; and Messner, S. F., & Rosenfeld, R. Crime and the American 
dream. Belmont, CA: Wadsworth, 1994. 
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CHAPTER SIX 
Defining Hate Crimes 
At least two seminal works which referred to most of the books and 
articles I read qualify, in my opinion, as indispensable resources for 
deconstructing the issue of defining hate crimes. Even though many works 
tackle this issue, I have pulled much of my material for this review from The 
Future of Terrorism: Violence in the New Millennium, (1998, Ed. Harvey W. 
Kushner, Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications), and Hate Crimes: Criminal 
Law & Identity Politics by James B. Jacobs and Kimberly Potter (1998, New 
York: Oxford). I found these two books to be good examples of representing a 
variety of views on the problem of defining "hate crime." I have also included a 
few other works that I sought for further comment after reading about them in 
one of these two books or finding them on my own. 
Part of the problem facing hate crime researchers is defining exactly 
what is a hate crime. Proponents have labeled everything from bigoted speech 
to political disagreements to disparagement of agricultural products as hate 
crimes (8. Levin Hate Crimes). 
•n rlc.fining "h~te f"fime II nnc. h~tQ f"rimc. rlc.tc.ct"1ve tolrl me. that though '!l'-6,.,,1111111 IVl 'Vflll J 'V1"11"'4 ....... V'Jll""~'-'\.V '- \. "'411" I 
he was not able to clearly define the term, "I know it when I see it." In this 
fashion, the meaning of "hate crime" depends largely on what is not a hate 
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crime. The controversial issues surrounding the defining of hate crimes has 
something in common with the equally controversial issues surrounding the 
defining of domestic terrorism. "Unlike other areas of criminology that have a 
precise definition of the criminal event (e.g., aggravated assault, robbery, 
murder, drug trafficking), there is no social scientific consensus on the 
meaning of domestic terrorism." (Hamm, Future of Terrorism 61). Likewise, 
hate crime is alternatively defined as right-wing violence, 1 xenophobic 
violence,2 racist violence, 3 racial attack or racial harassment, (Bowling qtd. in 
Hamm Conceptualizing Hate Crime 1-3) and racial violence (Bowling qtd. 3; 
Witte qtd. 92). Some do not consider "the symbolic status of victims or the 
motivation of perpetrators and simply treat the problem with existing criminal 
statutes" (Hamm, Future of Terrorism 68). 
Crimes motivated by hate or bias against minorities have been called 
hate crimes, hate-motivated crimes, bias crimes, bias-motivated crimes, 
possible bias crimes, and ethnoviolence (Hamm, Conceptualizing Hate 
Crime). Such attacks have also been officially classified as acts of domestic 
terrorism" (Hamm, Future of Terrorism 68). Regardless of the attacker's 
motives, victims almost always are chosen for what they are rather than who 
they are. "This is why anti-gay hate crimes are a form of terrorism. The attack 
is against the community as a whole" (Herek and Berrill 58). 
The U.S. Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) uses the following 
definition: 
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A hate crime, also known as a bias crime, is a criminal offense 
committed against a person, property, or society which is motivated, in 
whole or in part, by the offender's bias against a race, religion, 
disability, sexual orientation, or ethnicity/national origin.(UCR). 
According to the F.B.I. definition, bias crimes are therefore not separate 
offenses, but acknowledge a specific motivation for a criminal event. This 
motivation is considered more pernicious and disruptive to communities, 
imposing " .. distinct emotional harm on victims" (Levin and McDevitt 10). In 
1993, 23 states used the FBI definition of hate crime4 (Hamm, Future of 
Terrorism 69), but states have been revisiting and enhancing these definitions 
ever since. For example, Oregon's hate crime definition currently includes 
harm done to victims because of "perceived race, color, religion, national 
origin, sexual orientation, marital status, political affiliation or beliefs, 
membership or activity in or on behalf of a labor organization or against a labor 
organization, physical or mental handicap, age, economic or social status or 
citizenship" (Perry 8). Some states are currently reviewing the legality of 
including under the hate crime definition historical acts such as the slave trade 
in early America and the forcible removal of Native Americans from their lands 
as officially-sanctioned programs. These are all representative examples of 
how extensive the definition can become: 
Therein lies the dilemma of defining hate crime. As with 'crime' in 
general, it is difficult to construct an exhaustive definition of the term. 
Crime -- hate crime included-- is relative. It is historically and culturally 
contingent. As the example[s] suggest, what we take as hate crime 
today ... in another time, in another place, may be standard operating 
procedure (8). 
34 
William Ellis argued before the National Research Council, "bias crime 
is a form of political violence" (Ellis 2). State governments and local 
municipalities have further muddied the waters by creating their own 
definitions in accordance with local traditions: 
Along with "religion, race, ethnicity, or sexual orientation," some states 
identified additional victim categories. Connecticut, for example, added 
those with "physical disabilities" to the list of possible victims. Florida 
added "color and ancestry" to the list, but not physical disability. Illinois 
added "color, creed, ancestry, and physical or mental disability." Rhode 
Island included the general categories of "disability" and "gender," but 
left out color, creed, and ancestry. And although Pennsylvania adopted 
most of the FBl's definition, the state did not recognize sexual 
orientation as a victim classification. It is possible, then, for the states to 
accept in full the FBl's definition of hate crime, to add victim 
classifications, or to delete those parts of the definition they may find 
inconsistent with local traditions. (Hamm, Future of Terrorism 70) 
The states can also identify specific offenses. In 1998, thirty-one states 
recognize cross burning as a hate crime. Twenty states did not have cross-
burning as a separate category (apart from "vandalism" or "destruction of 
property"). Maryland recognized that it is a bias crime to disrupt a religious 
meeting. Pennsylvania recognizes "paramilitary training" and "igniting racial 
violence" as part of their hate crime statute, but not bias against sexual 
orientation. South Carolina includes as part of its statute the wearing of masks 
to conceal individual identity on public property (Ellis 3). 
VVith so many definitions of both "hate crime" and "domestic terrorism" 
out there, it's no wonder that they would meet up one day and mix. U.S. 
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Attorney Lynne A. Battaglia declared at a Baltimore hate crime conference 
that the Oklahoma City bombing was a "hate crime" and that hate crimes are 
terrorist acts.5 The September 11, 2001, attack on New York and the 
Pentagon is frequently regarded as a hate crime by restorative justice 
advocates. 6 Social scientists often use the terms hate crime and domestic 
terrorism interchangeably7 (Hamm, Future of Terrorism 76-77). 
According to Jacobs & Potter, the concept of hate crime is loaded with 
ambiguity because it is difficult to determine "(1) what is meant by prejudice; 
(2) which prejudices qualify for inclusion under the hate crime umbrella; (3) 
which crimes, when attributable to prejudice, become hate crimes; and (4) how 
strong the causal link must be between the perpetuator's prejudice and the 
perpetuator's criminal conduct" (Jacobs 11). However, a recent study indicates 
that the ambiguity is a product of the effect of institutionalized prejudice acting 
up on the forces of definition in the legal context. "Thus, the diffusion of hate 
crime policies resembles the diffusion pattern of many other policy reforms." 
(Grattet et al). 
Some argue that black offenders who attack white victims are motivated 
by economics, not prejudice.8 A few have proposed removing crimes based 
upon anti-white prejudice from the definition of hate crime, 9 while others 
propose adding crimes based upon anti-female prejudice: 
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Feminist analysts and activists against violence all insist that violence 
against women must no longer be defined solely as a crime against an 
individual who happens to be female and is unfortunate enough to 
become a victim. Rather, this violence must be seen for what it is - a 
crime of misogyny, of hatred of women ... feminist theorists would 
suggest that society's acceptance of patriarchal assumptions and 
structures also accepts and condones these violations of women's 
autonomy (Copeland and Wolfe 3). 
This touches on another problem exacerbating hate crime: the 
pervasiveness of "everyday prejudice" of one type or another in a given 
society. Even the most liberal-minded white upper class activist against racism 
is enjoying privileges made possible by collective prejudice. "Proponents of 
white guilt explain that while whites may not necessarily be racist on an 
individual level, they live in a racist society that automatically grants them 
certain advantages at the expense of other people" (Monroy). Our basic civil 
rights paradigm does not go into detail regarding prejudice among European 
ethnic groups. "The contemporary multicultural discourse refers to 'Hispanics,' 
'Asians,' and 'Africans' as if they were single homogenous groups without 
divisive ethnicities. These classifications disguise enormous differences, 
historic animosities, and prejudices" (Jacobs 18). 
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Notes 
1 Hamm (1994) cites Heitmeyer, W. "Hostility and violence toward foreigners in Germany." 
Eds.T. Bjorgo & R. Witte. Racist violence in Europe. New York: St.Martin's, 1993: 17-28. 
2 Hamm (1994) cites Aronowitz, A. A. "A comparative study of hate crime: Legislative, judicial, 
and social responses in Germany and the United States." European Journal on Criminal 
Policy and Research, 2. 1994: 39-64. 
3 Hamm (1994) cites Loow, H. "Racist violence and criminal behavior in Sweden: Myths and 
reality." Terrorism and Po!itica! Violence. 7, 1995: 119-161.; Witte, 1993. 
4 Hamm (1998) cites Ball, R., & Curry, G.D. "Preliminary findings from National Report on 
Juvenile Hate/Bias Crime." Annual meeting of the Academy of Criminal Justice Sciences, 
Boston. March 1995. 
5 Hamm (1998) cites A Rosga from a work in progress entitled "Good cop/bad cop: 
Refashioning law enforcement as the thin blue line between bigotry and tolerance." According 
to Rosga, The conference took place three weeks after the bombing of the Alfred P. Murrah 
Federal Building. Battaglia was a keynote speaker. 
6 From personal notes of the author, gathered during attendance at the Victim-Offender 
Mediation Association Conference, Portland, Oregon, 2001. 
7 Hamm (1998) cites Aronowitz, A. A. "Germany's xenophobic violence: Criminal justice and 
social responses." Ed. M. S. Hamm Hate crime: International perspectives on causes and 
control. Cincinnati, OH: ACJS/Anderson:1994, 37-70; Berk, 1994; Hamm, M. S. "A modified 
social control theory of terrorism: An empirical and ethnographical assessment of American 
neo-Nazi Skinheads." Ed.M. S. Hamm, Hate crime: International perspectives on causes and 
control. Cincinnati, OH: ACJS/Anderson.1994: 71-90; Hamm, M. S. "Review essay on Jack 
Levin and Jack McDevitt's Hate crimes: The rising tide of bigotry and bloodshed." Journal of 
Criminal Justice, 22. 1994: 71-74; Kellett, A. "Terrorism in Canada: 1960-1992-" Ed. J. I. Ross, 
Violence in Canada: Sociopolitical perspectives. New York: Oxford University Press, 1995: 
286-315; Levin, J., & McDevitt, J. Hate crimes: The rising tide of bigotry and bloodshed. New 
York: Plenum, 1993; Ross, J. I. (1994). "Hate crime in Canada: Growing pains with new 
legislation." Ed. M. S. Hamm, Hate crime: International perspectives on causes and control. 
Cincinnati, OH: ACJS/Anderson, 1994: 151-172. 
8 Jacobs cites Marc L. Fleischauer, "Teeth for a Paper Tiger: A Proposal to Add Enforceability 
to Florida's Hate Crimes Act," 17 Florida State University Law Review 697, 706. 1990. 
9 Jacobs cites Carey Goldberg, "Neighbors Play Down Race, Seeing Act of Crazy Man," New 
York Times, Dec. 10, 1995, at 50; Pedro Ponce, "Some Question Use of Hate-Crime Laws by 
Victimized Whites," The San Diego Union-Tribune, May 5, 1994, p. A36; Marc L. Fleischauer, 
"Teeth for a Paper Tiger: A Proposal to Add Enforceability to Florida's Hate Crimes Act," 17 
Florida State University Law Review 697, 706. 1990; Paul Butler, "Raciaily Based Jury 
Nullification: Black Power in the Criminal Justice System," 105 Yale Law Journal 677. 1995. 
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CHAPTER SEVEN 
Hate Crime Law 
In the late 1980s, a significant increase in skinhead violence against 
minorities led U.S. civil rights activists to pressure Congress for laws requiring 
the FBI to gather and publish hate crime statistics (Ellis; Hamm American 
Skinheads). At the same time, 31 states enacted laws against bias or 
harassment, including interference with religious worship, and against cross-
burning (Finn and McNeil 52). This political consensus introduced the term 
hate crime into the lexicon of U.S. criminal justice administration and led 
Congress to enact the Hate Crime Statistics Act of 1990. Under the act, hate 
crimes are defined as 
crimes that manifest evidence of prejudice based on race, religion, 
sexual orientation, or ethnicity, including where appropriate the crimes 
of murder, non-negligent manslaughter, forcible rape, aggravated 
assault, simple assault, intimidation; arson; and destruction, damage or 
vandalism of property .... Bias would be reported when the law 
enforcement investigation revealed sufficient objective facts to lead a 
reasonable and prudent person to conclude that the offenders actions 
were motivated, in whole or in part, by bias. (UCR) 
The act led to the enactment of Public Law 101-275, requiring that the 
FBI gather data on hate crimes for an annual Uniform Crime Report (UCR). 
The law stated that "hate crimes are not [to be considered] separate distinct 
offenses, but rather traditional crimes motivated by the offender's bias." 
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Categories of bias were listed as "the victim's religion, race, ethnicity, or 
sexual orientation" (UCR). 
The first officially-collected hate crime data were supplied in 1991 by 
2,771 law enforcement agencies in 32 states. By 1993, data were collected by 
6,865 agencies in 46 states and the District of Columbia. Intimidation was the 
most frequently reported hate crime, followed by property vandalism and 
simple and aggravated assault. The data show that a single incident of hate 
crime often produces multiple offenses, victims, and offenders. The most 
serious hate crimes were catalogued as "group projects," suggesting a 
conspiratorial motive for violence. The most frequent motive for hate crime in 
1993 was race (62% of total incidents), and the most frequent victim was a 
black person. Religion came in second (17% of total), and Jews were the most 
frequent victims. Sexual orientation was third (11 %) and ethnicity was last, 
with Hispanics the most frequent victims. (Hamm, Future of Terrorism 70-72) 
The controversy over which right is more important---to protect freedom 
of expression or to discourage hate crime by regulating hate speech---arose in 
the 1990s and is best demonstrated in the evolution of two hate crime cases: 
R.A. V. v. St. Paul in St. Paul, Minnesota, and State of Wisconsin v. Todd 
Mitchell. 
In October, 1989, Mitchell, a young black man, left a movie theater with 
a group of friends after watching the movie Mississippi Burning. A scene in the 
movie portrayed members of the Ku Klux Klan killing a black man. After 
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walking out of the theater, Mitchell asked his friends if they wanted to "move 
on some white people" and about that time, a 14-year-old white boy walked by 
and Mitchell and his friends proceeded to catch the boy and beat him so 
severely, that he went into a coma. Mitchell was convicted of aggravated 
battery and sentenced to two years in prison. Under Wisconsin's Penalty 
Enhancement Statute, a hate statute similar to those in many states that 
boosted the offenses in which the victim was "intentionally selected" on the 
basis of "race, color, religion, disability, sexual orientation, national origin, or 
ancestry," Mitchell received an additional two years added to his sentence.1 
In 1982, St. Paul enacted a local hate crime ordinance which created a 
new offense: bias-motivated disorderly conduct. The ordinance stated that 
anyone who "places on public or private property a symbol, object, appellation, 
characterization or graffiti" that "arouses anger, alarm, or resentment in others 
on the basis of race, color, creed, or religion" was guilty of the misdemeanor 
offense of disorderly conduct. In 1989, the city amended the law to specifically 
include a burning cross or a Nazi swastika in the prohibitions. (Jost 57) 
Prosecutors invoked the St. Paul ordinance for the first time in R.A. V. v. 
St. Paul in 1990. A group of teenagers was charged with placing a burning 
cross in the front yard of Russ and Laura Jones, who had recently become the 
first black family to move into a predominantly white St. Paul neighborhood. 
The teenagers were also charged with violating the state's hate crime law. (57) 
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One of the defendants was a skinhead, and his attorney decided to 
challenge the constitutionality of the ordinance. He did not challenge the 
state's hate crime law, just the local ordinance. "In a country that values free 
speech, we should not have a law that says that expressing certain ideas, 
however offensive they may be, is in itself a crime," the attorney argued. The 
judge who heard the case agreed and struck down the ordinance. But the 
Minnesota Supreme Court reinstated the law in January 1991. The Supreme 
Court construed the law to be narrowly defined in terms of "fighting words," or 
words that have "a direct tendency to cause acts of violence by the person to 
whom, individually, the remark is addressed." The U.S. Supreme Court 
reviewed the case in June 1991. The Anti-Defamation League filed a brief to 
defend the law. The prosecuting attorney argued that it's one thing for a cross 
to be burned at the corner of a street, but another if it's "right in front of the 
Joneses' house." (58) 
The U.S. Supreme Court decision in 1992 revealed how clearly divided 
justices were on hate crime law issues. The justices voted unanimously to 
strike down the ordinance, but they divided into two camps with conflicting 
concurrences. Four justices decided that the ordinance was too broad and that 
it violated constitutionally protected forms of freedom of speech. Five justices, 
however, ruled on the basis that it was discriminatory because it targeted only 
specific types of bigotry - racial, religious, and sexual insults - but not on the 
basis of free speech. 
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Less than 24 hours after the R.A. V. decision came down, Wisconsin's 
Supreme Court cast out its Penalty Enhancement Statute which, in effect, 
nullified the additional two years in prison that Mitchell1 had received in . In 
ruling the law unconstitutional, Wisconsin's Supreme Court cited in part the 
day-old R.A. V. precedent and argued that the necessity to use speech to 
prove motivation "threatens to chill free speech" and steps into the realm of 
"subjective mental thought." Two months later, Ohio dumped a 1987 law 
similar to that of Wisconsin, deciding that it was unconstitutional for a "thought 
crime" law to punish conduct based on subjective mental processes motivating 
behavior. (Stinski 110) 
In the same week, the Supreme Court of Oregon voted unanimously to 
uphold one of its enhancement laws, arguing that since speech serves as 
evidence in other instances---the words "I am going to kill you," for example, in 
an attempted murder case--the enhancement law was constitutional. The court 
also argued that the law punishes the committing of certain acts and does not 
necessarily rely on speech. One could infer bias if every Saturday night a 
defendant traveled to Latino neighborhoods and assaulted a passerby who 
appeared to be Hispanic. The court wrote "There is a distinction between 
making speech the crime itself, or an element of the crime, and using speech 
to prove the crime." (110) Significant to this thesis is the argument concurring 
in R.A. V. v. St. Paul written by U.S. Supreme Court Justice J.J. Blackmun: 
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Significantly, the St. Paul ordinance regulates speech not on the basis 
of its subject matter or the viewpoint expressed, but rather on the basis 
of the harm the speech causes . ... Contrary to the Court's suggestion, 
the ordinance regulates only a subcategory of expression that causes 
injuries based on "race, color, creed, religion, or gender,'' not a 
subcategory that involves discussions that concern those 
characteristics. The ordinance, as construed by the Court, criminalizes 
expression that "one knows ... {by its very utterance inflicts injury on} 
others on the basis of race, color, creed, religion, or gender." In this 
regard, the ordinance resembles the child pornography law ... which in 
effect singled out child pornography because those publications caused 
far greater harms that pornography involving adults" [italics mine] (Baird 
63). 
The most important development regarding hate crimes since then is 
the Supreme Court's unanimous ruling in 1993 to uphold the constitutionality 
of bias crime penalty enhancement laws. This ruling permits increasing 
sentences for convicted hate crime offenders, a reversal of the ruling by the 
Wisconsin Supreme Court in Wisconsin v. Mitchell. "The Mitchell decision 
removes any doubt that properly constructed bias crime laws are 
constitutional" (B. Levin 8). 
In addition to the issues brought in these seminal cases, the opponents 
of hate crime laws argue that it is discriminatory to consider one murder to be 
more heinous than another, simply based on whether or not the murderer is a 
racist. "The horrendous crimes that provide the imagery and emotion for the 
passage of hate crime legislation [such as the hate crime murders of James 
Byrd and Matthew Shepard] are already so heavily punished under American 
law that any talk of "sentence enhancement" must be primarily symbolic." 
(Jacobs 13) 
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The proponents respond that there is a difference between bias-
motivated crimes and other crimes, and two of the differences are evidenced 
by the longer time it takes for victims to recover (Garnets 378, APA), and the 
fact that a bias-motivated crime is intended to intimidate an entire group of 
people (Finn 20). Crimes against gays and lesbians not only harm the 
individual victims, but instills fear in the entire community (Hernandez 848). 
Victims suffer more intensely when targeted for crime because of membership 
in a targeted group (Herek and Gillis). According to findings by the National 
Institute Against Prejudice and Violence, victims of ethnic violence suffer 21 
percent more trauma symptoms than other victims of similar crimes. (Stinski 
111) 
Though awareness of prejudicial attitudes in society have raised public 
interest and the establishment of hate crime laws, we may need to achieve a 
deeper level of collective introspection before we can be clear on what those 
laws should say and do. ''While homosexuality was removed from the 
American Psychiatric Association's standard diagnostic manual in 197 4, 
twenty years later, some mental health professionals and much of the public 
still thinks of homosexuality as a 'disease' needing a 'cure"' (Brenner 127). 
Notes 
1 State of Wisconsin v. Todd Mitchell. 
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CHAPTER EIGHT 
Typologies of Hate Crime Offenders 
In 1983, Jack McDevitt and Jack Levin created a typology of hate crime 
offenders. (Levin and McDevitt). The first category are thrillseekers who 
usually act alone. They are bored, and are looking for the excitement and 
power of assaulting someone who is not a member of their cultural or racial 
group. They generally choose their victims on a random basis. McDevitt and 
Levin found that, at the time of their study, about two-thirds of bias motivated 
activity fell into this category. The second category are reactors. Their bias 
motivated activities are often precipitated by a specific incident. For example, 
they'll direct their anger and frustration toward an 'outsider' who encroaches 
upon their neighborhood, means of livelihood, or way of life. In this way, 
victims are not exactly randomly chosen but the crimes against them are not 
necessarily pre-meditated. They are just in the wrong place at the wrong time. 
The crime is their message to members of the targeted group to stay out of the 
offender's neighborhood, church, school, or town. This type of bias motivated 
activity often escalates until the warning is heeded. It is estimated that a little 
over a third of hate crimes fall into this category. The third category is 
missionaries. They are on a 'mission' to eliminate all members of the targeted 
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group, regardless if there has been any specific incident that precipitated the 
hatred. This is the rarest type, representing about one percent of all reported 
activities. These are offenders who are more likely to seek out or are easily 
recruited into recognized hate groups for organized activities. The harassment 
and violence perpetuated by hate groups like the Ku Klux Klan (KKK) or 
Oregon's Volksfront that promote racial genocide are exemplary of these types 
of hate crimes (Levin & McDevitt). 
The academic work on bias-motivated activity tends to focus on hate 
groups and extremist organizations, although such groups were responsible in 
the early 1990s for only 3-7% of reported bias motivated activity. (52). The 
most historically recognized group in the United States is the KKK, but this 
organization has had many ups and downs since it became active in the 
1940s and is currently in decline (Blee 137). Another group (or group of 
groups) is on the rise, however, and is proving to be as or more troublesome 
than the Klan.1 
Skinheads began making themselves known in London in the mid-
1960s, but they weren't really as much focused on hating people as they were 
on venting their frustrations about lack of work, which they attributed to the 
influx of Indians, East Indians, and other individuals racially different from the 
majority of the Commonwealth. (Kleg 34) Skinheads first appeared in the 
United States in the late 1970s as part of the punk rock scene, and were 
thrillseekers more focused on fashion than fascism. By the mid-1980s when it 
47 
became clear to organized hate groups that these disenfranchised youth were 
ripe for the picking, Skinheads began aligning themselves as reactors with 
support from these groups. (Blazak, White Boys 985; Blazak, Ethnographic 
study). 
Blazak developed a typology of threats or "red flags of strain" that aid in 
forecasting where hate groups are most likely to lurk to find vulnerable 
recruits. I think the typology is useful for the purpose of this thesis, so I include 
it here in full. Blazak says that skinheads experience the "strain" of perceived 
threats in the following four categories. In addition, Blazak lists possible 
localized changes that trigger reactionary responses to perceived threats: 
(Blazak, White Boys 989): 
1. Threats to ethnic or racial status 
• growth in the minority student population 
• minority student organizations or events 
• shifts to multicultural curricula 
• racial conflict in which the institutions appear to support the 
minority group 
2. Threats to gender status 
• conflict over female participation in male activities 
• feminist activist groups 
• anti-sexual violence events or programs 
3. Threats to heterosexual status 
• sexual minority organizations 
• gay pride events 
·inclusiveness movements or sponsored dialogue 
4. Threats to economic status 
• factory layoffs 
• large employer downsizing 
• high competition for manual labor or service sector jobs 
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Blazak appears to be mostly in agreement with the Levin and McDevitt 
typology but has deconstructed it a little further in order to make predictions. 
This typology is useful not only for identifying where to find recruits before they 
are recruited (hopefully for the purpose of redirecting them away from joining 
hate groups), but also what one could expect to hear about (at least in part) 
when engaging in any form of dialogue with offenders resulting from a justice 
action. 
The period in which most youths are active as skinheads lasts about six 
months. Those who remain in the movement for any appreciable length of time 
may become 'missionaries' and eventually move onto adult groups such as the 
Christian Identity Church (Kleg 43). Of 173 individuals indicted under the FBl's 
counterterrorism program during the 1980s, 103 were members of or 
associated with right-wing groups frequently regarded as being part of the 
"Christian Identity Movement" (Smith 32). They were all American and the 
average age was 39. The majority of them (97%) were white males with no 
higher than a G.E.D. equivalent. More than half were unemployed or living 
below the poverty line, and nearly all came from rural areas of Arkansas, 
Idaho. Kentucky, Colorado, and Arizona (47). 
In 1991. Sociologist James Aho analyzed reports of 51 murders related 
to U.S. right-wing activity between 1980 and 1985. He found that about half 
involved participants in the Christian Identity Movement. Aho created a 
typology of Christian Identity members. He divided them up into two camps: 
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the "hedge-hogs" (grand theorists) and "foxes" (empiricists). Hedgehogs "are 
able to fit events as diverse as earthquakes, venereal disease, and commodity 
prices into an overarching theoretical scheme" (Aho 17). In contrast, foxes are 
concerned with ordinary problems like school textbooks and sex education. He 
found that is the hedgehogs who ignite trouble, and the foxes conform (17). 
In another typology study, Aho found, like Smith, that the hedgehogs 
are "exceptional only in their ordinariness" (67). The most violent among them 
were average white men who had been "Boys' State representatives, high 
school yearbook editors ... rock 'n' roll musicians ... one-time teen athletes, a 
champion amateur golfer, and a high school teacher with a masters degree in 
counseling" He found them to be "likable" and "good workers" who were "very 
polite" as young men (66). 
Although there are youths in neo-Nazi movements who can count as an 
influence a childhood of trauma and abuse, this is not always the case and it is 
probably unwise to make that assumption about Skinheads. Researchers have 
found that a critical factor in the development of the frustration that leads to 
violence among neo-Nazi youth is information transmitted via the Internet, 
racist books, journals, films, and most important, music (Hamm, American 
Skinheads; Wooden and Blazak 216). 
Hamm interviewed 36 U.S. skinhead leaders between 1989 and 1992. 
His findings dispute the stereotypes of skinheads as undereducated products 
of child abuse. "The Skinheads were predominantly young white males from 
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working-class backgrounds who reported no early childhood trauma nor any 
abuse by their parents. The majority of them were either enrolled in high 
school, were high school graduates now working blue-collar jobs, or were 
attending a university." (Hamm, American Skinheads 83) But it could be 
argued that these findings are more a reflection of the typology of a skinhead 
group /eaderthan the average member 2 who calls himself a skinhead 
because he walks the walk and talks the talk. Based on his observations, 
Hamm came to define the Skinhead movement as a "terrorist youth 
subculture" (84). Thus, we have one more definition to add to the mix. 
Typology of a Reformed Offender 
To segue into the next part of my thesis, I would like to include briefly 
another typology here: the reformed hate crime offender. For the purpose of 
determining how (or if) a restorative justice approach is useful in hate crime 
cases, it is just as important to know how a young person gets herself out of a 
life of hate as how she got in. For it is in the reformative process that 
accountability for one's actions- a cornerstone of restorative justice - is 
realized. 
It begins with flash of insight into the stark reality of what one has 
become, which leads to an identity crisis. After abruptly leaving the life of hate 
behind, there comes a dark long journey through immense guilt and profound 
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self-loathing. And then, finally, comes a long, upward climb of personal 
transformation (Ezekiel; Greason; Hasselbach). 
The first stage - the flash of insight - is so profound and personal that it 
is never the same from person to person. Blazak, who co-founded Oregon 
Spotlight, an organization that helps Pacific Northwest youths leave hate 
groups, describes what it was like when that flash hit one Nazi skinhead who 
called him for help out of the movement: 
I [Blazak] asked what turned him around, and he said it was an 
offhanded comment I had made about peanut butter being invented by 
George Washington Carver, a Black man. "Man, I love peanut butter 
and I'm not going to give it up just so I can be a good racist!" he told 
me. (Blazak, White Boys 999) 
Compare that to the flash that hit David Greason, who was a leader in the 
racist British National Front and in the violent National Action (NA) of Australia: 
I don't think you drop intolerant politics because you've realized that 
The Protocols of the Learned Elders of Zion is fraudulent or that Hans 
Eysenck's theories on race are Eurocentric. You can't simply figure 
your way out of a life. It really falls apart when you're willing to give 
people the benefit of the doubt. It comes when you're sitting in a cab 
with some Vietnamese taxi driver and you're remembering those lines 
you've always trotted out when you're in an argument-Look, all people 
prefer their own, and it's nothing to do with hatred, but everything to do 
with what people have in common except this time you're thinking, on a 
one-to-one basis, here, now, in this RSL cab, could I have more in 
common with this Vietnamese driver than I have with a National Action 
member who keeps guns under his bed? [italics mine] (Greason 298-
299). 
and the flash that hit lngo Hasselbach, the former leader of Germany's most 
formidable neo-Nazi organization: 
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I woke up the next morning to the news on my clock radio; three people 
had been burned alive in a neo-Nazi attack in the town of Molln in 
northern Germany .... Oddly enough, considering the thousands of 
attacks that had occurred in the last couple of years, this was the first 
with fatalities .... I felt a certain boundary had been overstepped .... I 
told my Komerads point-blank that this was a sad and awful event and 
we must at least re-think our methods if they were to lead to this .... 
Something had permanently snapped inside of me, and I couldn't think 
that way anymore. I couldn't think of these Turks just as foreigners. 
They were also people-dead people with families [italics mine] 
(Hasselbach 322-333). 
The differences in these flashes of insight reflect what makes each one 
of these men individuals. But what is the same between them - and with 
everyone, racist or not - is that we are all capable of moments of clarity that 
can lead to seemingly impossible transformations. 
Notes 
1 There are many groups and many groups of groups, but I have chosen only one for the 
purpose of comparing typologies. 
2 There are also 'angry white girls' in the hate movement - though they are in the minority, their 
number are increasing exponentially. Kathleen Blee has written for many years about racist 
women and what motivates them to join hate groups, and has found that they also do not fit 
the stereotype of the undereducated and abused (Blee 2002). Her most recent work features 
many "conversion stories" by young women who join hate groups. 
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CHAPTER NINE 
Restorative Justice Principles 
Unlike my literature review for the topic of hate crimes, I did not find 
what could fairly constitute well-established "seminal works" that represent 
well all sides of a critical discussion of restorative justice. The field as an 
academic pursuit is new, and much of the literature up until the last few years 
has been written by restorative justice practitioners. I did find a few sources 
that critically compare restorative justice theory to political science theories, 
and a few sources out of Australia and the United Kingdom that were critical of 
either principles or practices, and I included these sources in this section. 
For the most part, I pieced together parts from several sources to 
present a variety of definitions and principles underlying restorative justice, 
and no doubt some of these will change as we speak, since the field itself is in 
a state of flux. I thought it would be best to provide the variety and dynamic 
nature of principles in this field, because it is an important observation for the 
purposes of this thesis. I also confined my literature review to those works 
which were mostly relevant to my thesis. 
For this section on "principles" I tried to separate those principles that 
constitute a working philosophy of restorative justice from those that seem to 
apply mostly to practice, and I address the latter in the next section on 
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"Restorative Justice Practices." This separation seemed to occur naturally out 
of the literature, with more literature devoted to principles of practice than to a 
philosophical standard driving theory. To guide my decision as to which pile 
the source work should go into, I observed whether or not the source work 
and/or author went from the direction of theory to practice, or practice to 
theory. The former material is presented in this section, and the latter in the 
next section. 
Conflict Theories 
Nils Christie is one of the modern philosophers to address the problem 
of how we handle conflict in contemporary times and especially how it is 
handled in the dominant criminal justice paradigm. He argues that conflict has 
not only been captured by the State but subsequently defined by the State, 
attributed with a measure of seriousness (e.g. first degree murder, second 
degree, murder, etc.), and is then relegated to various procedures depending 
upon that level of seriousness. This system of processing through legal 
definitions and abstract procedures has resulted in the depersonalization of 
conflict which replaces the views, perceptions and wishes of those actually 
involved in the conflict (Conflict as Property 12). These views are well 
supported when one examines the literature on victims, their role within the 
traditional court process and how they view courts as a means of resolving 
conflict. The way that Western legal systems handle crime compounds the 
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disempowerment that victims feel, first at the hands of offenders and then at 
the hands of a professional, remote justice system that eschews their 
participation. The lawyers, in effect, "steal our conflict" (33). 
As Emile Durkheim 1 before him, Christie is a proponent of the 
perspective that conflict possesses inherent positive benefits. However, as the 
above discussion illustrates, the appropriation of conflict by the State has 
resulted in conflict losing many of its intrinsic and socially reinforcing values 
(Conflict as Property 16). The opportunity for the victim to publicly express the 
personal impact the offender's behavior may have had is not only lost, but 
more unfortunately, depreciated, as is the opportunity to express outrage over 
what has occurred. The victim is the brunt of the consequences for breaking 
the state rules and expressing the outrage they well deserve to feel. Rather 
than perceiving outrage as reinforcement for the importance of maintaining 
societal norms, the hurt and anger of victims are dismissed as "vengeful", 
"retributive" or "punitive" and at best "left to the experts." (16) The value of 
conflict as a personal expression, then, is entirely negated. 
Christie's lament has been echoed in recent criminological discourse 
after resurgence in debate as to 'What is the appropriate role and voice of 
victims of crime?" Once marginalized, victims of crime are now argued as 
integral if the criminal justice system's response to crime is to be at all 
effective (Shapland et al. 1). The refocus on victims as crucial, if not central to 
responses to crime is a strongly held principle in restorative justice. 
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Defining Restorative Justice 
Just as defining "hate crime" is at the center of debate in literature 
about hate crime, a definition of restorative justice is problematic. Also 
likewise, it depends on who you ask, and a good deal of definitive terms are 
dependent on contrast: restorative justice is that which retributive justice is not. 
In essence, advocates of restorative justice argue that victims must 
participate in the process if justice is to be effective. The philosophy, theory 
and practices of restorative justice are shaped by the fundamental belief that 
the impact of a crime can only be resolved between and by those who are 
affected. Theoretically, practices under the umbrella of restorative justice 
involve the establishing of settings and procedures whereby those most 
affected by the incident, namely the victim and their offender and supporters of 
both, meet and discuss the incident, its consequences and how best to deal 
with the harms and issues arising from the crime. Through dialogue 
processes, reparations are negotiated and forgiveness and healing are 
initiated (Sharpe). 
There are two important features often associated with restorative 
justice: 1) victim and community are participants in the administration of 
justice, and 2) offenders are members of and accountable to the community. 
The emphasis on the victim is particularly important. Advocates of restorative 
justice have been highly critical of the criminal justice system for neglecting the 
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victims of crime and focusing on the punishment and rehabilitation of 
offenders. Meeting the offender addresses certain victim needs (e.g., 
emotional satisfaction and personal healing) and brings the victim's 
perspective into the administration of justice. As a result, restorative justice 
provides a sense of victim empowerment (Sharpe). 
thusly: 
Daniel Van Ness describes the basis premises for restorative justice 
1) Crime is primarily a conflict between individuals resulting in injuries to 
victims, communities, offenders and their relationships. Only 
secondary is it lawbreaking. 
2) The overarching aim of the criminal justice process should be to 
reconcile parties while repairing the injuries caused by crime. 
3) The criminal justice process should facilitate active participation by 
victims, offenders and their communities. It should not be dominated by 
the government to the exclusion of others. (Van Ness 23) 
This particular set of standards is repeated frequently in restorative 
justice articles and papers. From there, definitions begin to vary. 
In the light of restorative justice, crime is viewed primarily in an 
interpersonal context. Ideally, conflicts are settled outside of courts and are 
considered to be a matter for handling within the victim's and offender's kin 
and community, as was done in days of old (Zehr, Lenses 99-100). While the 
traditional "retributive justice" views crime as a violation of the state and its 
focus is on punishment of the offender, restorative justice views crime as a 
breakdown in relationships between offender, victim and community. "Crime is 
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a violation of people and relationships. It creates obligations to make things 
right. Justice involves the victim, the offender, and the community in search for 
solutions which promote repair, reconciliation, and reassurance" (181). 
Restorative justice is also a distinctively different model from the "rehabilitative 
approach" which focuses on the treatment of the offender, and which sees 
individuals not as social actors but as objects (Walgrave 230). 
Sometimes restorative justice is defined in terms of how it should be 
considered as a thought process, rather than what it does in action. 
Restorative Justice is said to be "a way of thinking" about responding to the 
problem of crime, and a set of values that guides decisions on policy, 
programs and practice (Pranis). Victims' involvement and perspectives are 
essential to the processes of defining the harm of each crime and identifying 
how that harm might be repaired. A comprehensive restorative response to 
crime engages the community as a resource for reconciliation of victims and 
offenders, and as a resource for monitoring standards of behavior. "A 
restorative response to crime is a community-building response" (Pranis). 
Transformative justice, healing justice, satisfying justice -- Susan 
Sharpe includes all of these terms under her umbrella of the conceptual 
markers that guide restorative justice. Sharpe states that restorative justice is 
"justice that puts energy into the future, not into what is past" (Sharpe 7). 
Restorative justice invites full participation and consensus, sets out to heal 
what has been broken, seeks full and direct accountability, reunites what has 
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been divided, and strengthens the community to prevent further harms (7). 
"Restorative justice is an orientation, not a program" (19). 
The "restorative" in the term refers to the principle of reuniting what was 
divided, and regaining good graces. Community divisions that occurred as a 
result of the harm inflicted begin to fuse in resolution. Sharpe uses the word 
"reintegrate" to describe this process,2 highlighting the importance of 
reintegration for both victim and victimizer. The victimizer is forgiven and 
welcomed to continue in relationship with the community. For the offenders, it 
is important to feel the community's continued support and faith in their ability 
to avoid doing further harm. For the victim, it is important to reintegrate by 
losing the "victim" status, which can lead to a type of shunning behavior all its 
own in a given community. In summary, for both parties it is important to 
regain full identity, no longer primarily identified in terms of the incident (11 ). 
An important oft-repeated principle of restorative justice is 
strengthening of the community so as to prevent future harm. But most 
principled-based accounts do not elaborate on how the community is 
strengthened by the process. This is one area where Sharpe's presentation of 
restorative justice goes a step beyond some of the more common 
descriptions. Most are interested in addressing the particular issue or harm 
"on the table" in an inclusive manner. Sharpe argues instead that restorative 
justice has to look at structural issues. It has to work actively toward a more 
just future, essential in discussing sociopolitical conflicts in the community. 
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She writes that, "people who have long felt excluded from the community 
through prejudice, poverty, or unemployment have no place to come back to 
after apology and reparation. They also may have little interest in feeling 
connected with and responsible to the community that has shut them out" (52). 
This is an important principle to debate when determining the 
boundaries between what constitutes restorative justice as a professional 
practice and restorative justice as a human rights campaign. Ruth Morris 
writes that "restorative justice is not enough if it doesn't address, 
fundamentally, the issues of racist and classist injustice which lies at the root 
of every one of our systems" (R. Morris 17). These forces have already 
created conditions of inequality, enacted in job markets, standard of living, and 
inaccessible opportunities. Biases in the power structure often prevent 
participation from minorities. La Prairie writes that justice structures such as 
sentencing circles need the support of "larger arms of government" on "bigger 
fronts such as job training and education" or else, "these alternatives will see 
relatively modest success" (530). 
Roots of Restorative Justice Principles 
The early concepts of restorative justice rested upon the involvement of 
the community as a party in the process. Ideally, restorative justice calls forth 
the empowerment of the community (McCold 90). It is communitarian ideals 
such as public problem-solving and citizen participation that lie at the heart of 
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restorative justice (Bazemore, Three Paradigms 44). Advocates often report 
that restorative justice has roots in an ancient way of settling disputes 
(Galaway & Hudson 1; Braithwaite, Crime. Shame; Strong and Van Ness; 
Zehr). 
New Zealand Judge Frederick W.M. McElrea characterizes three 
distinct restorative justice principles: the transfer of state power to the 
community, a mechanism for negotiated community responses to crime, and 
the participation of victim and offender in a process of healing (McElrea 120). 
In an explicit connection to Aboriginal justice, he writes, "it is these elements of 
restorative justice that link the New Zealand initiative [family group 
conferencing] with Maori concepts of justice based on restoration of harmony 
within a network of family, community, and tribal relationships" (122). 
This example represents a widespread view in the progressive 
restorative justice community that restorative justice is fully compatible with 
Aboriginal justice, and is in fact, an extension of it, as was discussed in the 
section of this paper entitled "Background: Restorative Justice." However, 
recent criticism argues that this claim is baseless (Daly, The Real Story).3 
Reintegrative Shaming 
An interesting theoretical contribution borrowed from aboriginal justice 
models has been the idea of re-integrative shaming. This concept views not 
the fear of state punishment as the most effective method of deterrence, but 
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the anticipated experience of personal rebuke from those we care about; the 
experience of shame. Shame can either be stigmatic, when it locates the 
'cause' in the offender, or re-integrative, when it maintains that the offender is 
an essentially decent person (Masters 237). 
John Braithwaite 's theory of "re-integrative shaming" maintains that in 
any restorative justice setting -- and in criminal justice, for that matter -- a 
distinction must be made between the offender and the offender 's behavior, 
so that exclusionary shame can be avoided. He argues against a 
preoccupation with finding theories for why people commit crime. He suggests, 
instead, asking the question: Why do most of us not commit crime and comply 
with rules and procedures? Braithwaite's idea is that most people are deterred 
from committing crime on two levels: internally, through their sense of right 
and w.rong; and externally, by the threat of disgrace or condemnation by 
people with whom they have a significant relationship (Crime. Shame 23). 
Therefore, in order to maintain an offender 's existing social bonds, any 
condemnation should be in the context of care and respect. This is consistent 
with restorative justice principles; however, there are dissenting voices in the 
field who say that shaming of any kind has no place in the healing process. 
The philosophy behind restorative justice is "making things right." (An 
Immodest Theory 23) This is achieved by condemning the behavior of 
offenders while preserving their dignity. For many offenders, it is a harsher 
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sentence to have to face their victims, community and family, than to spend 
time in a correctional facility. 
Contrasting Restorative Justice & Retributive Justice 
The following are interesting examples of how restorative justice is 
defined in terms of how it contrasts against its opposite: retributive justice. 
"Restorative justice is a normative theory and a reform movement attempting 
to bring dialogue and reconciliation between victim, offender, and community 
to the center of criminal justice practice" (Dzur and Olson 2).4 Restorative 
justice is critical of the dominant retributive and rehabilitative models of 
criminal justice and rejects professionalism. Instead, restorative justice draws 
on diverse aboriginal practices of conflict resolution (2). Restorative justice 
brings to light major flaws of the current system: that it regards offenses as 
against the state (rather than against people), that it is mired in procedural 
rules, that the moral force behind punishment is the authority of the state 
rather than the need to be accountable to those who have been harmed, and 
that the punitive needs of the state overrules the needs of the victim (2). In 
summary, the current system is flawed because it abstracts the crime away 
from the actual experiences of victim, offender, and community (2). 
Restorative Justice addresses the harm that communities suffer as a 
result of threats to security and notions that individuals have the right to feel 
safe in their community. However, harm to a community is a vague notion and 
64 
restorative justice proponents have not provided an adequate basis for 
determining what is meant by "communal harm" (von Hirsch 675). 
Restorative justice is not just a focus on communal & individual harm, 
however. It is a principle that guides a change in the relationship between 
communities, individuals and state. It calls for a shift in the "essential role of 
the citizen from service recipient to decision maker with a stake in what 
services are provided and how they are delivered" (Bazemore, The 
Community 334). 
The aspect of community participation in restorative justice is similar to 
idealizations of public discourse in deliberative democratic theory in the field of 
Political Science (Ozur and Olson 3). In deliberative democratic theory, public 
discourse is to be held in the "wild public sphere," unaccountable to the rules 
and procedures of the "formal public sphere" of legislatures (Habermas 166). 
James Fishkin adds that ideal deliberation requires participation by a random 
sample of citizens that have the opportunity to discuss the matters at hand 
with professionals and politicians. However, the deliberations are directed by 
the people, not by the professionals or politicians (Fishkin 132-134). In both 
deliberative democratic theory and restorative justice principles, a key virtue of 
public participation and dialogue is the airing of values, something seen as 
missing from the mainstream. 
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Contribution from Aboriginal Justice Principles 
Some authors are very cautious about the potential of the restorative 
justice approach. It has been claimed, that the enthusiasm for indigenous 
justice systems, such as the one which inspired Family Group Conferencing in 
New Zealand, is a fashion and irrelevant for a different cultural context 
(Brogden 15). There is merit in this argument. It is worth consideration whether 
or not aboriginal justice can be transported to "the global village." Consider 
this example of how aboriginal justice worked more or less in some native 
traditions in Canada: 
In the distant past, a person who committed a crime was taken to the 
centre of the village and publicly stripped of all their possessions and 
sent from the village to with only what he or she wore. In a year's time 
they could return and bring gifts to the person or people they had 
committed the crime against. (As told by Twylah Hurd Nitsch to 
Kulchyski et al 88) 
It is debatable whether or not this sort of simplistic solution to the 
problem of crime could be exercised in the 21st century. However, applying 
the principles of aboriginal justice can and do apply with some degree of 
successful universality. A frequent interpretation of Aboriginal justice explains 
it in terms of healing, or returning balance to a person, situation or community. 
This understanding of justice is a natural progression of a worldview based on 
relationships, holism, and cycles. Patricia Monture-Okanee explains that 
"harmony, not justice is the ideal" (Reclaiming Justice125). Personal balance 
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is sought for the offender and victim, as well as communal balance, restored 
through strengthened connections. 
Aboriginal peoples differ in the ways they understood and administered 
justice traditionally. As is true with other groups of diverse peoples and 
cultures, there is no one method that could be said to describe Aboriginal 
traditional justice in entirety. However, common themes have been identified 
by Aboriginal people and scholars, principles that stand in distinction from 
mainstream justice. For instance, Monture-Okanee suggests that justice, truth, 
tolerance, understanding, and equality would have been essential to traditional 
Aboriginal justice (126). 
One distinction that enjoys such consensus was foreshadowed by 
Sharpe's explanation of justice as orientation, not process. However, Sharpe 
needs to extend her definition a little further to reflect an Aboriginal principle: 
beyond orientation to action. This is the first and central point concerning 
Aboriginal justice. Justice is not a program to be administered, it is a lifestyle, 
a belief system, and a worldview. Rupert Ross passed on a message he heard 
repeatedly in his investigation of Aboriginal traditional justice: 
Within traditional Aboriginal understandings, a justice system involved 
far more than simply controlling how disputes were handled after they 
broke out. Instead, the primary emphasis was on teaching individuals 
from birth how to live together in ways that avoided or minimized them 
in the first place. (255) 
Thus, a discussion of traditional justice necessitates examining how to 
live the "good life" envisioned above. Monture-Okanee affirmed this 
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relationship when she explained the expression for "law" in her Mohawk 
language. She said that to her people, the closest thing to "law" meant, "the 
way to live most nicely together. (Thinking About AJ 227)." In this context, 
restorative justice appears not only to be inspired by indigenous systems but it 
is at the same time re-activating Western legal traditions, such as the 
traditions posited in the deliberative democracy model mentioned previously in 
this section. This is not to glorify forms of community justice that have the 
threat of violence attached to them (Davis 19). Community justice is simply a 
justice system that is controlled by the local community and it does not have to 
be restorative in its approach. Restorative justice has to be careful to use 
traditions of community justice only if they reflect restorative and non-violent 
principles. 
Critical Views 
The scant critical literature of the last few years focuses on practices 
and program evaluations. I found two recent papers by scholars in Australia 
that touch on principles. Michele Venables interviewed victims who had 
undergone a form of restorative justice conferencing in Australia, to determine 
victim satisfaction with the process (Venables). She found that up until the 
time of her study, research findings on conferencing models, carried out 
primarily by restorative justice practitioners or trainers, had largely 
concentrated on presenting positive findings. Studies cited victims as being 
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highly satisfied with the process, pleased with the outcomes and feeling 
'restored' as a result of the conference.5 "Of concern is that the relatively few 
negative aspects of conferencing have not been reported in any detail" (77). 
Venables found that, in fact, the components of the restorative justice action 
that were most cited by proponent studies as being the key to victim 
satisfaction were not supported by the findings from her interviews with 
victims. For example, proponent studies concluded that victims feel "restored" 
after receiving apologies from their offenders. But Venables found no evidence 
for this, and in fact cited from interviews that victims often felt the apologies 
were coerced by the restorative justice practitioners (79). 
The "continual broadening of the scope of what defines restorative 
justice" has recently been criticized (Daly, The Real Story), and is perhaps 
partially implicated in what Mark Umbreit calls the "McDonaldization" of 
restorative justice practices such as victim-offender mediation (Umbreit 105). 
Often the term is associated with the resolution of broader political conflicts 
such as the reconstruction of post-apartheid South Africa, post-genocide 
Rwanda, and post-sectarian Northern lreland.6 
One reason that the definition is problematic is the idea of restorative 
justice has become so popular, the term is now applied after the fact to 
programs and policies that have been in place for some time, or it is used to 
describe reputedly new policing and correctional policies.7 Adding to the 
problem is one of lack of objective empirical evidence since so much of the so-
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called "objective studies" have been carried out by high-profile advocates.8 
Until careful, objective empirical work is carried out, we cannot be certain what 
is going on or the degree to which any of these newer or repackaged practices 
could be considered "restorative" (Daly, RJ in Diverse Societies). 
Regardless of how practices are reported, restorative justice 
apparently aims to restore harmony based on a feeling that justice has been 
done. Restoring harmony alone, while leaving an underlying injustice to fester 
unaddressed, is not enough (Braithwaite, RJ & a Better Future). "Restoring 
balance" is only acceptable as a restorative justice ideal if the "balance" 
between offender and victim that prevailed before the crime was a morally 
decent balance. "There is no virtue in restoring the balance by having a 
woman pay for a loaf of bread she has stolen from a rich man to feed her 
children" (RJ & a Better Future). Restoring harmony between victim and 
offender is only likely to be possible in such a context on the basis of a 
discussion of why the children are hungry and what should be done about the 
underlying injustice of their hunger. This is the sort of situation that 
demonstrates the need for clear boundaries of theory, definition, policy, and 
practice of restorative justice, so that practitioners do not find themselves in 
one moment acting as neutral mediators and in the next moment as biased 
activists. 
Restorative justice cannot resolve the deep structural injustices that 
cause problems like hunger. But we must demand two things of 
restorative justice here. First, it must not make structural injustice 
worse .... Second, restorative justice should restore harmony with a 
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remedy grounded in dialogue which takes account of underlying 
injustices. (RJ & a Better Future). 
It is this accounting for underlying injustices that is important to a 
realization of what restorative justice may or may not be able to accomplish in 
the arena of hate crimes, and which I will address in my findings based on this 
literature review. 
Notes 
1 Among other aspects of conflict theory supported by Durkheim, one aspect relevant to this 
thesis is that man is an animal with strong emotional desires and susceptibilities, and that 
particular forms of social interaction designed to arouse emotions operate to create strongly 
held beliefs and a sense of solidarity within the community through participation in these 
rituals of social interaction. 
2 I have heard said in restorative justice circles that there may be a need for new terminology 
to reflect what has been learned about the process. One such term I've heard more than a few 
times is "reintegrative justice." Another is "transformative justice." I am currently working on a 
project with a group of former (disillusioned) attorneys, under the heading of "transformative 
law." 
3 See "A Brief History of Restorative Justice" earlier in this paper for more information on 
aboriginal roots of restorative justice principles. 
4 I think it is interesting to note that Dzur and Olson are political scientists who define 
restorative justice as a theory and a reform movement, rather than a set of principles. It is 
indicative of the way definitions vary according to field of interest. 
5 Venables cites the following: Hayes, H. & T. Prenzler & R. Wortley. Making Amends: Final 
Evaluation of the Queensland Communitv Conferencing Pilot. Griffith University, Brisbane, 
1998; Umbreit, Mark. Victim Meets Offender. The Impact Of Restorative Justice and 
Mediation. Criminal Justice Press: New York, 1994; and Strang, H., G.C. Barnes, John 
Braithwaite & L. W. Sherman (1999) A Progress report on the Canberra Reintegrative 
Shaming Experiments (RISE). <www.aic.gov.au>. 
6 
Daly cites the South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission ( 1998) The Report of the 
Truth and Reconciliation Commission. <http://www.org.za/truth/report>; Christodoulidis, 
Emilios (2000) "'Truth and reconciliation" as risks', Social & Legal Studies 9(2): 179-204; 
Dignan, Jim (2000) Restorative Justice Options for Northern Ireland: A Comparative Review. 
Belfast: The Stationery Office Bookshop: 12-13; Drumbl, Mark A (2000) 'Retributive justice 
and the Rwandan genocide', Punishment & Society 2(3): 287-308. 
7 Daly cites Carol La Prairie (1999), "Some reflections on new criminal justice policies in 
Canada: restorative justice, alternative measures and conditional sentences," Australian and 
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Notes, cont 
New Zealand Jou ma I of Criminology 32(2): 139-52; and Adam Crawford (2001 ), "The 
prospects for restorative youth justice in England and Wales: a tale of two acts," in K. McEvoy 
and T. Newburn (eds.) Criminology and Conflict Resolution, London: Macmillan. 
8 Mark Umbreit, social worker and director of the Center for Restorative Justice & 
Peacemaking at the University of Minnesota, is well cited in the field, though careful 
examination reveals that his body of work consists mostly of self-directed program evaluations 
which are ultimately always favorable. 
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CHAPTER TEN 
Restorative Justice Practices 
This section of the literature review concentrates on the most common 
practices of restorative justice. There are some notable exceptions to the 
literature I use for this section. There are proponents of restorative justice that 
have written extensively on one sort of practice or another and who are prolific 
in the field. However, in my research I found some of these prolific writers 
were also professional practitioners and often spoke of the entire realm of one 
practice or another to be wholly represented by their own experience. I left out 
these professional assessments and instead looked deeper for critical 
scholarship. I also looked for voices from a culturally diverse set of authors, 
since the principles of restorative justice are often represented as relying on 
such diversity. Finally, I concentrated on aspects of practices or whole 
practices that had relevance to my inquiry. 
Absent from this part of the literature review is the practice of truth & 
reconciliation commissions. I covered this practice as a matter of historical 
record (see "A Brief History of Restorative Justice"). 
Tony Marshall offers a much-cited workable description of restorative 
justice in practice: 
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Restorative justice is a process whereby all the parties with a stake in a 
particular offense come together to resolve collectively how to deal with 
the aftermath of the offense and its implications for the future ( qtd. in 
Braithwaite Immodest Theory). 
Restorative Justice advocates support a form of alternative discourse 
outside the mainstream of regular criminal justice rhetoric, where victims can 
communicate with offenders, and where offenders can take accountability for 
their actions in a personal meaningful way. Nils Christie describes the setting 
for this type of alternative justice that occurred in a Tanzanian village. I include 
it here in full not only as an interesting example of how this form of discourse 
works, but also to show an example of what is considered "village justice": 
1. The parties ... were in the center of the room and in the center of 
everyone's attention. They talked often and were eagerly listened to. 
2. Close to them were relatives and friends who also took part. But they 
did not take over. 
3. There was also participation from the general audience with short 
questions, information, or jokes. 
4. The judges, three local party secretaries, were extremely inactive. They 
were obviously ignorant with regard to village matters. All the other 
people in the room were experts. They were experts on norms as well 
as actions. And they crystallized norms and clarified what had 
happened through participation in the procedure (Conflict as Property). 
Victim-offender Mediation 
By far, the most widely used practice of restorative justice in the United 
States is victim-offender mediation. What differentiates the contemporary 
practice from the example above is that the "experts" are simply the victim(s) 
74 
and offender(s) themselves, and the role of mediator(s) is to take part but not 
to take over. 
The process goes more or less like this: The victim and offender sit 
down at the table face to face, usually at a public meeting space, and the 
mediator is there to keep the process going and to help participants keep the 
focus on repairing the harm. The victim and offender both have equal time to 
tell their stories of what happened and how the crime affected them. Then they 
work out how to repair the harm. This resolution can take many forms: 
restitution, community service, written or verbal apologies, or they can be as 
creative in their agreement as they want to and can agree to be. In the case of 
a dialogue revolving around serious or severe crime, such as malicious 
harassment or murder, the process can also include many separate meetings 
between the mediator and the victim and offender, individually, to make sure 
that once the mediation takes place, there is no or little potential for re-harming 
the victim. What these processes have in common is that they are all victim-
initiated - there is no standard model in the U.S. that would have practitioners 
approaching victims due to requests by offenders. Some prisons allow the 
offender to make a statement of interest in participating in victim-offender 
dialogue, but the statement is filed away for the day when, and if, the victim 
makes the request (Sharpe). 
Two approaches are currently in vogue in the U.S. and Canada as far 
as how a mediation is conducted. I have been trained and have conducted 
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mediations using both approaches so I will describe the processes from 
personal experience. One approach is to concentrate on neutrality by having 
the mediator enter the mediation "cold," meaning thats/he has no prior contact 
with victim or offender before entering the mediation space. In this scenario 
the mediator's role is to make sure the dialogue is fair and balanced, meaning 
that both sides (victim and offender) have a chance to tell their stories and 
respond to issues that arise. The mediator shows no overt emotion except that 
which would be expected from hearing stories for the first time, but even then 
the issue of maintaining on air of impartiality is crucial. In the second 
approach, the mediator takes on a mediation "case" and meets with the 
participants ahead of time, each in their own settings, to discuss their 
concerns. By the time the mediation takes place, the participants have 
(hopefully) developed trust for the mediator, each in their own time, and the 
mediation itself progresses in a less formal, more relaxed manner than the 
prior scenario. This is considered to be the "humanistic" approach while the 
former is considered to be the "neutral" approach by proponents. 
In my view, what differentiates these approaches is the issue of 
partiality: the "neutral" approach strives for impartiality, while the humanistic" 
approach strives for partiality equally towards all. This is an approach called 
"balanced partiality" which is described by Yarrow, in his work as a Quaker 
conciliator, as "a sensitivity to all the individuals and groups involved in a 
dispute:" 
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[The conciliators] treat the people with whom they are talking ... with 
respect and attention. They really listen to them and i mean by that that 
they still the noise and confusion of their own thoughts and emotions 
and open themselves up completely to what the other person is trying 
to say, or perhaps feeling without expressing. This kind of listening ... 
has a very real effect on the person being listened to. He becomes 
calmer, himself more receptive and open to ideas (Yarrow 265). 
The "judges," or any criminal justice officials of any kind, are usually not 
a part of victim-offender mediation itself but are participants in the decision to 
refer offenders (especially youth offenders, in the U.S.) to restorative justice 
programs. The clarification process Christie observed in Tanzania is at the 
heart of the contemporary practice, with dialogue focused on clarifying roles, 
accountability, and how to repair the harm. But restorative justice practices 
also include family group conferences, circle sentencing, and restitution 
panels. All the practices have in common that they are dialogue-driven and 
they seek to produce a resolution to harm or conflict that is satisfactory to all 
concerned. The goal of victim-offender mediation is to preserve ongoing 
interpersonal relationships more successfully than standard court procedures 
because it is assumed that the parties desire to preserve coherence within a 
community and their ability to influence each other. 
Restorative justice arose out of a desire to involve victims in the 
criminal justice process. It is hoped that mediation will allow the offender an 
opportunity to understand what he or she has done by directly (or sometimes 
indirectly) hearing the victims tell their stories. This process can be painful for 
the victim, but the offender also feels pain because the process can involve 
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confronting excuses so the offender realize the harm he or she created. The 
hope is that the process is a catalyst for changing behavior, and that victims 
and offenders can achieve consensus as to the true consequences of the 
crime and what is needed to restore balance. Mediation allows for "the airing 
of (victim's) grievances ... more complete than in court, as the range of 
relevance is extremely broad" (Wright 23). 
I think if I would have had to actually face the people whose homes I 
burglarized, when I was a kid ... I think it might have changed my life. 
Maybe I would have figured things out sooner -maybe I wouldn't be an 
ex-convict now. -- convict in Washington County, Minnesota (Nicholl 
120) 
Not all mediation processes, however, have as their objective to provide 
a service to victims and offenders to explore the personal harm of a crime. 
Sometimes it's just a matter of alleviating overcrowded court systems while 
keeping within a semblance of justice. Criticism centers on the mediation 
serving the interests of one party more than the other, and benefiting the 
justice system more than either of the parties. The first complaint is still a 
dominant criticism of mediation in cases of domestic abuse. (Clarke). 
Neighborhood justice centers -- which are sometimes referred to as 
restorative -- are more settlement driven than dialogue driven, focusing on 
outcomes that fit the system rather than providing a dialogue process that in 
itself is reconciliatory. For this reason, many mediation programs are not 
necessarily consistent with the values of restorative justice. (Nicholl 116) 
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The first Victim Offender Reconciliation Program (VORP) was set up in 
1976 in Ontario, Canada, with the first known contemporary case of victim-
offender mediation (see "A Brief Restorative Justice" in this thesis). Elkhart, 
Indiana, followed up with a VORP that began mediation under a new 
paradigm. "The old paradigm's focus is on blame-fixing for the past; the new 
one, while encouraging responsibility for past behavior, looks to the future, 
problem-solving the obligations created by the offense" (Wright 28). The 
Elkhart VORP was, therefore, probably the first time the concepts of mediation 
and the principles of restorative justice were brought together. Victim-offender 
mediation (or victim-centered offender dialogue, as it has come to be known in 
some circles) builds on Christie's argument that human conflict should be 
"made visible" and "nurtured" for the potential it may bring to foster community 
solidarity and interpersonal growth (14). 
Family Group Conferencing 
I would never have believed we could resolve this problem so easily -I 
would have bet it all would have blown up. I was even afraid there 
would be bloodshed. I'm delighted, but I still can hardly believe it. 
-Mother of a student involved in a 
conference following a racial incident 
in Minnesota (Nicholl 127) 
Variations on family group conferencing models are growing in 
popularity as a restorative justice practice in some parts of the U.S. and 
Canada, following what has been standard practice for some time in Australia 
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and New Zealand (though recently this practice has come under criticism in 
those countries 1). 
Family group conferencing began in New Zealand on the heels of the 
1989 legislation The Children, Young Persons, and Their Families Act. Years 
of frustration with a criminal justice system that had failed to curb recidivism 
and that was said to encourage dependency on welfare, provoked 15 years' 
worth of debate. Since 1989, all young offenders, except in the case of rape or 
homicide, have been dealt with by conference (129). 
Conferencing was introduced after the indigenous Maori people put 
pressure on the criminal justice system because they resented having their 
young offenders removed from their traditional communities. A fundamental 
Maori value is that "we are all part of one another and the main purpose of 
justice is healing for all" (J. Morris et al 28). The Maori wanted the New 
Zealand justice system to adopt their way of handling conflict. For the Maori, 
the main purpose of justice is that everyone is healed (33). 
The basic elements of family group conferencing are simple. Once 
offender(s) admit their guilt and have been declared so at a pre-sentencing 
hearing, victims, offenders, their supporters (friends and family), and members 
of the community are given an opportunity to meet in the presence of a 
conferencing facilitator. Participants are encouraged to discuss the direct or 
indirect effects of the crime on them, each in their own perspective (assuming 
that the impact on the victim may be a different story than the impact on the 
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victim's family). Once the harm is identified and agreed upon by all, a 
resolution is negotiated and agreed upon by all for repairing the damage and 
making a plan to correct the offender's behavior (Nicholl 128). 
A successful conferencing results in a plan to re-accept the offender 
back into the community, however all participants define their community. The 
level of responsibility by the community for the well-being of the offender is 
more highly focused in the group conferencing model than in any other 
restorative justice model I studied. The guilt or "whakama" felt by the offender 
is recognized as part of their punishment, since it involves lowered self-
esteem, depression and withdrawal from social interaction. In very mild cases 
the person afflicted with whakama may come out of it on their own, but in most 
cases it is assumed that they will need the help of others (Metge 94-98). 
In practice, a big part of this process is for offenders to make amends 
with the victims. Offenders are encouraged to demonstrate active 
responsibility by making reparations, sharing remorse, and apologizing. 
More creative solutions have transpired. "In one amazing case, a female victim 
who had been robbed at gunpoint had the offender live in her home as part of 
the [conferencing] plan" (Braithwaite, Crime. Shame 172). 
Reintegrative shaming is often a component of family group 
conferencing, sometimes overtly but more often not. Following up on his own 
question: Why do most of us not commit crime and comply with rules and 
procedures?, Braithwaite looked at the Japanese response to crime, where 
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the shaming dimension of their culture plays a significant role (Japan has the 
lowest crime rates of any industrial nation). Braithwaite found that when 
wrongdoers in Japanese culture are confronted within a context of supporting 
relationships, a process of "reintegration" can begin. The confrontation by 
people who are significant to the wrongdoer creates a "shaming experience" 
that separates the unacceptable behavior from the person. Overtly, this 
involves the community and conference participants denouncing the 
unacceptable behavior, but equally voices the need to re-accept the individual 
back into the community (173). 
However, the public has voiced concern (if not outright dissent) about 
some actions that are being performed under the umbrella of "reintegrative 
shaming practices" in the U.S. For example, a Texas judge had incorporated 
shaming into his sentencing decisions, and in one case an offender was 
required to wear T-shirts with the words, "I am a sex offender'' on the front, for 
life (98). In another case, an offender was made to apologize to his victim of 
domestic abuse on the steps of city hall, even though the victim did not want to 
be there. In Rehoboth, Delaware, local police are putting the photos and name 
of offenders who commit public nuisances in the local newspaper, hoping to 
shame them (175). 
The focus on apologies elicited during conferences has been an issue 
of contention with restorative justice critics, as apologies are often perceived to 
be insincere and a product of the conferencing rather than a true expression of 
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remorse. 1 In addition, critics of this practice with the Maori say that New 
Zealand's enthusiastic acceptance of this approach 
... signifies the indigenization of New Zealand's criminal justice system 
rather than the empowerment of Maori. .. [R]ather than signifying the 
ability of our justice system to culturally sensitize itself, family group 
conferencing in fact underlines the willingness of the State to 
disempower Maori by employing their justice processes while denying 
them a significant measure of jurisdictional autonomy (Tauri). 
Proponents of group conferencing say the practice also shares many 
elements of community policing: community involvement, shared ownership 
and responsibility, collaborative problem solving, identifying ongoing issues of 
concern, and looking for long term resolution (Nicholl 127). The conferencing 
model thereby expands policing beyond working at a distance from the 
community in relation to crime, to a broader approach involving consultation 
and enlisting the participation of others to resolve crime. As a result, "the 
police adopt a strong harmonious relationship with anyone who might be able 
to help in addressing the crime" (153). However, the possible repercussions of 
having neighbors police neighbors has not been addressed. 
In the U.S. and Canada, family group conferencing is gaining 
recognition. Vermont, Oregon, Maine, Minnesota, Pennsylvania, Georgia, 
California, and Indiana have either pilot or established conferencing programs 
(130). What sets conferencing apart from victim-offender mediation and 
reconciliation programs is its potential for responding collectively to crime and 
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to social problems. In that respect, it is perhaps the most suitable candidate for 
handling hate crimes. (127) 
Sentencing and Healing Circles 
The two main types of circles are sentencing circles and healing circles. 
The concept of circle sentencing evolved in Canada, initially as an 
alternative to traditional sentencing of indigenous offenders (Pollard 13). Circle 
sentencing is a community-based sentenc\ng process administered by 
members of the community, law enforcement, and members of community 
support services. A sentencing circle can be held in a court house or a 
community space (Thomas). Participants include the offender and the victim 
and their supporters; a judge, a community elder, prosecutor, defense 
counsel, police and court workers; who sit arranged in an inner circle; and 
friends and relatives of the offender and the victim, professionals such as 
alcohol and drug treatment workers and members of the local community; who 
sit in an outer circle (Linker 117). 
While procedures vary from community to community, generally the 
judge or community elder formally opens the sentencing circle, then each 
participant introduces themselves and explains why they are attending. The 
prosecutor outlines the facts of the offense, and the defense counsel 
responds. Then all participants address the offender and the victim and 
discuss the extent of similar crimes in their community, the underlying reasons 
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for it, the impact on victims and on the community, what must be done to heal 
the victim and rehabilitate the offender, and what the community can do to 
prevent similar crimes (Linker; Pollard). Participants develop a sentence plan 
which the judge uses to sentence the offender. Custodial sentences can be 
included in a sentence plan; but this is rare (Linker 118). 
The sentencing circle reunites several months later to examine the 
offender's progress towards completing the sentencing plan. If their progress 
has not been satisfactory, participants can agree to modify or extend the 
sentence plan, or abandon it. In this case the offender is sentenced by a 
traditional court (120). 
Proponents of circle sentencing argue that it enables participants to 
contribute directly to the sentencing process, and provides much more 
information about the offender, the impact of the offense, and problems 
experienced in the community, than the traditional system can provide (123). 
Critics argue that it costs much more than traditional court sentencing 
processes because it takes longer and uses up more court and community 
resources (125). It is also criticized on the basis that it gives communities an 
unstructured discretion in dealing with offenders, leading to inconsistent 
sentencing outcomes, and that sentence plans may end up being too lenient 
or too harsh for the offense committed, depending on the attitudes of 
participants. (Roberts and LaPrairie). On the other hand, it is arguable that 
closely examining the circumstances of individual offenders and communities 
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facilitates responsive sentencing which increases the prospects of 
rehabilitating offenders (Linker 128). 
Circle sentencing is increasingly being used to sentence both 
indigenous and non-indigenous offenders in the U.S., Canada, Europe, 
Singapore and New Zealand. Parts of Australia and Queensland have also 
experimented with circle sentencing (Pollard). 
Healing (or peacemaking, or community) circles are held for either the 
victim (including in cases where no offender has been caught) or for the 
offender, and are conducted privately with those selected to share decisions 
about what needs to be done and how the offender will change his or her 
behavior (Pranis). Like conferencing, there is more emphasis (than with victim-
offender mediation) on developing a consensus on social and personal 
problems surrounding crime. The goal of the healing circle process is to build 
agreements on needs, hopes, and the means for their fulfillment. Participation 
is voluntary, and everyone who attends has an equal voice. "The emphasis is 
on interdependence and connectedness between people and on promoting 
healthy connections that improve the well-being of those 
involved" (Nicholl 156). 
Like so many other restorative justice practices, healing circles 
originated in aboriginal communities. Mccaslin describes a healing circle that 
took place in 1994 the lnnu community of Sheshashit in Newfoundland, 
following a sexual assault on a woman in the community: 
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The {1 O] participants had coffee and tea prior to the circle starting. Then 
all participants moved into the large meeting room and sat in a circle on 
the floor. With joined hands a prayer was shared. Jack then explained 
to the participants the symbolism of burning sweetgrass and smudging. 
If participants found it meaningful they were invited to smudge and Jack 
went around the circle. He spoke lnnuaimen first and then in English ... lt 
was explained to participants that what happened in the circle should 
be guided by the participants' acceptance and use of four principles: 
honesty, kindness, sharing and respect. Each person in turn would 
have the chance to speak uninterrupted. If they chose not to speak, 
they would pass the small "talking stone" on to the next person because 
no one would be forced to speak. There were four rounds of the circle 
so there were four opportunities for speaking. The first round of the 
circle was for each participant to explain why they were present in the 
circle. The second round was a chance for each participant to speak 
directly to L., to share concern, support and encouragement. The third 
round was for each participant to speak directly to Gavin, to share with 
him directly feelings about him. The fourth round was the chance for 
each participant to make recommendations to those in the circle, and 
especially to Gavin, about what could or should be done at this point in 
time to help bring about resolution to this situation. (Mccaslin) 
In this example we see that what may distinguish a healing circle from a 
sentencing circle is the use of traditional rituals and acts of community 
solidarity. This is perhaps the one distinguishing feature that is most 
prominent, but there is also the feature of informality (beyond the established 
rituals) that is not so present in the sentencing circle model. 
Notes 
1 As was noted in the previous section on restorative justice principles, studies in other parts 
of the world are critical of some aspects of group conferencing, finding that components such 
as offender apologies and restitution did not adequately satisfy victims' expectations of the 




The fifth step in Comstock's model of critical research in the social 
sciences calls for elucidation of the "fundamental contradictions" which have 
developed due to "actions based on ideologically frozen understandings" 
(Comstock). This analysis will follow the subset of steps suggested for this 
process: 
-- Compare conditions with understandings; 
Critique the Ideology; and 
Discover imminent possibilities for action. 
Conditions vs. Understandings 
One of the first interesting contradictions I found was actually in the 
form of an irony. In Allport's The Nature of Prejudice, the description of a 
"fanatic" has characteristics in common with the "integrated" individual who is 
thought to have gained control of his or her prejudicial nature. "It is the rigid 
consistency of the fanatic (whether of a bigot or a crusader for equal rights) 
that is regarded as pathological in our society" (337). At the same time, Those 
who want integration wish to face their prejudices and ethics and put them all 
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"under the dominance of a wholly consistent philosophy of human 
relationships. This striving for wholeness and maturity requires a consistency 
that is extremely hard to achieve" (338). The contradiction here is that in order 
to overcome one's prejudicial nature, it seems that one must strive for a 
consistency of thought and action that at some point can be regarded by some 
as fanaticism - which is the mark of the extremist! As it turns out, this irony 
appears to play out in the rhetoric of the two fields, with each side claiming the 
other side to be fanatics of sorts (e.g. "right-wingers," "Zionists," "hawks," 
"doves," etc.), and may be implicated in what becomes "ideologically frozen 
understandings" (Comstock) in both fields. This contradiction is apparent in 
the compromise solutions cited by Allport: "An outstanding fact of social life is 
that the multiplicity of roles a man has to play forces him into inconsistent 
behavior" (337). The process of striving for integration while at the same time 
avoiding fanaticism can only lead to instances of inconsistent behavior that at 
the very least slow down the momentum of any social movement. What also 
appears to happen as a way to survive this inner struggle is that adherents of 
one movement will insulate themselves from other movements, in order to 
maintain equilibrium. Examples include the reluctance of white upper middle 
class adherents of the women's liberation movement of the 1960s to take on 
the agendas of discrimination against lesbians or African-American women, for 
fear the movement would not be taken seriously. "Part of the overwhelming 
frustration black women felt within the Women's Movement was at white 
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feminists' unwillingness to admit to their racism. This unwillingness comes 
from the sentiment that those who are oppressed cannot oppress others" 
(Thistle). This denial of one's personal prejudice while struggling to eliminate 
prejudice in social contexts fulfills three of Allport's four modes (334) of 
"contrary impulses" : repression, defensive rationalizations, and compromise 
solutions. But the fourth mode - "integration" - is problematic. Ironically, the 
contradiction of definitions of "consistency" in describing fanatics and tolerant 
"integrated individuals" shows how fundamentally related in conviction may be 
the liberals and the conservatives. 
The people who are studying hate crime as a social issue and 
restorative justice as a prescription have in common the problem of 
"fuzziness" of definitions. I once asked a police officer 'What is a hate crime?" 
and she said, "I can't always define it very well but I know it when I see it." I 
asked a victim-offender mediator "What is restorative justice?" and he said, "I 
can't always define it exactly, but I know it when I do it." Fuzziness is this state 
of "knowing it" intuitively but not being able to adequately define it. A 
movement or practice can fossilize if its intent can never be adequately 
defined. It is clear that the public is divided on what constitutes a "hate crime," 
but it is also clear that the hate crime activists are equally divided. Likewise, 
those researching the theories and practices of restorative justice do not agree 
on what constitutes a restorative justice "action" versus any other kind of 
prescriptive action beyond the ambiguously retributive. In addition, there 
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appears to exist separate sets of definitions of restorative justice - one set 
defines it in terms of principle, while another set defines it in terms of practice. 
This sort of fuzzy status of definitions leads to a related problem: 
"bandwagon syndrome." This is a metaphor for the problem of every sort of 
crime eventually being defined as a "hate crime" (along the lines of how, since 
September 11, every violent or threatening act by a politically motivated group 
has been re-defined as "terrorism") and every "feel-good" action in any justice-
related movement being lumped into the category of "restorative justice." The 
"bandwagon syndrome" in the hate crime movement is a way of saying 
"everybody on board who has ever been a hate crime victim!" Since the hate 
crime definition is constantly being changed by political rhetoric, eventually so 
many people "climb on board" that there is nothing distinct enough about the 
definition to make it viable. I have read accounts where a row of SUVs were 
vandalized on one street and therefore the crime is a "hate crime against SUV 
owners," and another an anti-fur activist was charged with a "hate crime 
against capitalists" for smashing a fur store window. 1 
Likewise, in the restorative justice movement, there is a propensity for 
"all good things" to be claimed as restorative justice actions while "all bad 
things" are claimed to be retributive. This propensity not only goes for "things" 
that happen along the way, but "things" that happened in the long ago. "The 
idea of restorative justice has become so popular, the term is now applied 
after the fact to programs and policies that have been in place for some time, 
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or it is used to describe reputedly new policing and correctional policies" (Daly, 
RJ in Diverse Societies).2 I personally became aware of restorative justice 
"bandwagon syndrome" when, after explaining a few concepts of restorative 
justice to a professor, she said, "I've never heard of restorative justice, but 
from what you're telling me, it must have come from feminist theory." Though it 
can be said that all justice movements have in common some principles and 
theories, it may be more useful to make clear the distinctions rather than the 
similarities while a new movement is trying to find its momentum among the 
plethora of social causes that individuals are daily encouraged to care about. 
Critique of Ideology 
The final contradiction I see in both of these issues as they play out in 
contemporary times is that the ideological rhetorics tend to steer clear of 
issues of class and economics in favor of a focus on character and principle. 
In other words, prejudice is presented as important because of its status as a 
character flaw, and upholding restorative justice principles is presented as 
important because it is "taking the higher ground." If we view prejudice as 
simply a character flaw, we don't have to pay any attention to what societal 
strains may be implicated in what eventually results in hate crime; we can just 
focus on treatments for character flaws. If we view restorative justice as being 
worthwhile simply on the basis that it is "taking the higher ground," we don't 
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have to pay so much attention to what economic or power structure changes 
may be needed to reduce crime. 
John Braithwaite, in his keynote address at the first North American 
Conference on Conferencing, said that "restorative justice will never become a 
mainstream alternative to retributive justice unless long-term R[esearch] and 
D[evelopment] programs show that it does have the capacity to reduce crime" 
(Braithwaite qtd. in Wachtel).3 We may have "evidence" that victims, 
offenders, and restorative justice practitioners find restorative justice actions to 
be principled and just, but we have not adequately demonstrated that any 
restorative justice action significantly reduces or prevents crime. Though there 
have been several studies conducted to measure rates of youth offender 
recidivism, these studies have not factored in other crucial variables at the 
time they participate in a restorative justice action. This is important because it 
may be shown that offender recidivism is often reduced, with or without any 
restorative justice action, by other factors. Also, there has been no study that 
follows offenders when and if they move out of the jurisdictional areas in which 
the recidivism statistics are gathered. 
Restorative justice practitioners claim that recidivism is not the best 
indicator for success of an action, and that "empowerment" of the participants 
is a more important outcome. However, research has shed scant light on what 
"empowerment" means or how to measure it, in order to make the claim that a 
restorative justice action will help one to feel "empowered." In fact, recent 
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follow-up research on victims who underwent restorative justice actions has 
shown that victims sometimes feel no less "empowered" than they did before 
the action, and sometimes feel less empowered (Daly, The Real Story; 
Venables). 
Likewise, we may have adequately proven that hatred is a bad thing 
and people shouldn't have it, but we have not proven that upholding the 
viability of the "hate crime" category in our systems of justice will reduce the 
conditions that lead to the hate that leads to the crime. Jay Macleod, in his 
book Ain't No Makin' It asserts that as long as "social problems are reduced to 
problems of individual morality and pathology in contemporary American 
politics, there is no critique of the class structure ... " (267). As long as 
inequities in the social hierarchy are discussed solely in terms of racial and 
ethnic intolerance, the issue of poverty remains a discussion solely for "the 
ethnic community." Whites living in poverty or who are undergoing traumatic 
displacement of other types are excluded from this conversation. In any case, 
it is white upper- and middle-class citizens that should be accountable for the 
discussion of resolutions. 
As indicated by Blazak's initial inquiry into strain theory (Blazak, 
Ethnographic study) as a basis for defining the problem of hate-motivated 
violence, no matter how much a justice practice can claim "higher ground" in 
principle, it will tend to reproduce existing relations of inequality (Daly, RJ in 
Diverse Societies 182). It may take social restructuring that redistributes 
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wealth and changes divisions of labor and power before we will see reductions 
in crime of any kind, but particularly of crime that is motivated by awareness of 
deeply-rooted inequities. 
Perry found that hate crime offenders may be using hate crime as a 
way to forge "relational identities" in society (Perry 52). "The structures of 
oppression and their supporting institutional patterns provide the context and 
constraints within which we 'do difference' in as human actors" (53). When 
there appears to be so few "niches" left in which to clearly differentiate oneself 
from all others in terms of identity, some may choose identification with an 
extremist movement as a reflection of how few choices of identity they see for 
themselves. This has little to do with "hate," per say, and much to do with the 
strain of societal inequities that are never addressed in that context. 
Possibilities for Action 
So far this paper has shown that the sought-after congruencies 
connecting hate crimes research with restorative justice principles have mostly 
to do with shared contradictions in principle and action. There is one shining 
example of how a typical restorative justice action (victim-offender mediation) 
played out in the case of a hate crime, when skinheads vandalized a 
synagogue and, after being charged in court, agreed to meet with the rabbi 
and other synagogue members for a mediation in order to hear out the victims 
on the harm done by their crime (Lerman). It was discovered during the 
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mediation that what primarily motivated the offenders was not a principled 
hatred of Jews, but the strain of feeling like outcasts of society: they were 
runaways, poor and displaced, and had been bouncing through foster homes. 
"They had been inculcated into neo-nazi thought as just 'something to do,' 
without really understanding what it meant" (1).4 
This scenario has been repeated in my own personal experience as a 
mediator and in working with hate crime offenders and former offenders. One 
former skinhead, speaking as part of a presentation for which I was also a 
speaker,5 tells groups nationwide about his experience getting into the 
skinhead movement, and for basically the same reasons: feeling displaced 
and unwanted, from a broken family, and bouncing through foster homes. He 
also explains that he was able to leave the skinhead movement because a 
perceptive foster mother, a psychologist, found how to reach him: 
She talked to me. Every day. About everything -- how was I doing, what 
did I need, stuff like that -- but never a word about the nazi tattoos on 
my arms or the swastikas on my bedroom wall. She just asked me how 
I was, what did I need, over and over, making sure I was taken care of 
and felt safe. She always made sure I had everything I needed -- food, 
clothes, bus money. She always had stuff for me to do around the 
house and the yard, so that I had a reason to be home. Eventually, over 
time, I found I didn't need to go to [skinhead meetings] to feel good 
about myself. I felt good just going home and hanging out. 5 
What seems to work here is not that the racist is convinced his or her 
racism is a bad thing he or she should be cured of, but that racism is but a 
symptom of some greater ill -- traumatic displacement; feeling unwanted and 
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unimportant, being denigrated to a lower status of identity. In this particular 
case, the elevation of status from consistently "unimportant" to consistently 
"important" seems to have played a major role in the rehabilitation of the 
offender, especially since the racism was never addressed. 
There is evidence outside of the testorative justice field that appear to 
have some hope for pinpointing the basic inequities fueling xenophobia. 
Several youth programs across the country have focused on the issue of youth 
hate crime by putting offenders through a rigorous program of psychological 
evaluation and therapy, multi-hour educational programs, and community 
service (Malloy). Looking through summaries of all the programs, the 
overwhelming congruency is that efforts are made to relieve social inequities 
being experienced by the offenders. "Offenders are placed in professional 
settings in the community, not homeless shelters or HIV clinics, to defeat 
stereotypes they may have of certain groups and to increase their awareness 
of the inherent value of diversity" is a feature of the Juvenile Diversion Project 
sponsored by the Anti-Defamation League in New York City. Though the goal 
is to get the offenders to see how they have stereotyped others, it may also 
have the added value of bringing offenders into interactive social contexts they 
may have thought of as off-limits to them by virtue of their class or economic 
status. All the programs rely heavily on creative community service work (e.g. 
not just picking up trash on the freeway), which also may have similar effects. 
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An experiment in inter-group behavior carried out by Muzafer Sherif 
and his colleagues was discussed earlier in this paper (see "Hate Crime 
Causes" in this thesis). Sherif randomly assigned 12-year-old boys to two 
groups at a Boy Scout camp. Within each group the boys were taught to 
cooperate. After they were all getting along very well with members of their 
particular group, Sherif set up a series of competitive activities to pit each 
group against each other, with prizes awarded to the winning group. There 
were also situations set up to disrupt the balance of fairness in the distribution 
of food. As predicted, these conflicts and disruptions resulted in name-calling 
and food-throwing between members of each group, "and within a very short 
time a full-scale riot was in progress" (Aronson qtd. in Baird 131). Then Sherif 
eliminated the staged conflicts and initiated non-competitive social contact 
between the boys. But to the surprise of all, this did not end the hostilities ... in 
fact, hostilities escalated, even when the boys were engaged in benign 
activities like sitting around watching TV (131). 
What finally brought these boys back to their original state of getting 
along? The key appeared to be the creation of a task that required inter-
dependence in order to elicit empathy. Sherif arranged for a vehicle to get 
stuck in the mud, and when the boys found that the only way to get unstuck 
was to cooperate in solving the problem, the act of cooperation spurred them 
to reunite as one group and hostilities vanished thereafter (132). Sherif asserts 
that the activity generated empathy because every boy was needed equally for 
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the task to be successful, and each, by experience, knew how difficult the task 
was for all. This had the effect of putting all the boys on the same level. There 
were no inequities. And their former mutual hate was never addressed. 
Notes 
1 I read about the SUV case at Denverchannel.com, and the fur store case at 
LibertySearch.com, both on the WWW. 
2 Daly cites Carol La Prairie (1999), "Some reflections on new criminal justice policies in 
Canada: restorative justice, alternative measures and conditional sentences," Australian and 
New Zealand Journal of Criminology 32(2): 139-52; and Adam Crawford (2001 ), "The 
prospects for restorative youth justice in England and Wales: a tale of two acts," in K. McEvoy 
and T. Newburn (eds.) Criminology and Conflict Resolution, London: Macmillan. 
3 John Braithwaite's address was titled "Linking Crime Prevention to Restorative Justice," 
presented at the First North American Conference on Conferencing, Minneapolis, Minnesota, 
August 6-8, 1998. 
4 The parties agreed that the offenders would spend some time with the rabbi and the 
synagogue members learning more about Jewish traditions and fixing the damage done by 
the vandalism. I did not find any documented follow-up to this action for an analysis on how 
the action may have affected the offenders over time. 
5 The presentation, "Healing Hate: Responding to Hate Crimes Restoratively," took place in at 
the 2001 VOMA Conference in Portland, Oregon. My co-presenters were Steve Stroud, former 
skinhead and co-director of Oregon Spotlight, an organization that helps youths leave 




I grew up believing that I was safe. Most people in my white, middle-
class, North American world did not get shot at. Even adding the fact of 
my being a lesbian in no way prepared me for murder. Lesbians I knew 
got called names--an aggravating, uncomfortable, infuriating experience 
but not generally dangerous. I grew up as a Jew, knowing that my 
father had fled from Austria because of the Holocaust. That kind of life-
endangering oppression was history to me, or something that happened 
to other people, with other skin colors or names different from mine 
(Brenner 159). 
Hate crime is a symptom of a deeply-rooted societal problem that is 
based on economic and power inequities. This is perhaps the most important 
"deeper issue" I found from researching and writing my thesis, and which is 
primarily responsible for those uncomfortable feelings I had before I started my 
research. I agree with Jack Levin when he says that hate "originates not in the 
ranting and raving of bigoted extremists at the margins of society but in the 
tacit approval of the ordinary, even decent, people who are located squarely in 
the mainstream" (J. Levin, Violence of Hate). The biggest (and hardest) lesson 
I learned from this review is that you can fool yourself into believing you are 
doing your part to make a better world, but what you might really be doing is 
helping to cover up the real problems. 
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Claudia Brenner and Rebecca Wight were hate crime victims, but that 
is not all that they were. They were also both from well-to-do families and they 
were college students on the track toward lucrative vocations in the fields of 
engineering and architecture. Brenner is currently an architect in upstate New 
York. She endured a horrible crime that no one should have to go through, but 
it was inevitable that after such an event she would receive the best of care in 
her long recovery process. She was able to heal successfully and be a better 
for it because she had the benefit of a marvelous support system in place 
before she experienced her tragedy, and which made it possible for her to 
enter back into her community successfully and gracefully. But I wonder what 
would have transpired if the two lesbians making love that day were actually 
homeless immigrants who had fled a war-torn country and were living in the 
park for lack of any other place to go. What story would I have read about 
them? If a similar fate had ever fallen upon the shooter, who was terminally 
homeless and had an IQ of about 70, would there be such a support system 
readied for him? The victims and the offender in this case really do come from 
different worlds, despite the fact that on the surface the claim can be made 
they are all members of categorical minorities. It is easy to make the issue of 
hatred toward racial or sexual minorities as being "the problem," but is 
xenophobia the only reason for hate crimes? The idea that the victims and 
offender in this case are "members of the same community" that could find 
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some point of authentic reconciliation is perhaps oversimplifying the underlying 
problems. Perhaps it will make the work of healers valid and empowering, but 
it does not solve the very real issues of poverty and oppression that will 
remain long after the healing rituals are over. 
I found that even the legal and social complications in the hate crime 
issue were often smoke screens that made it possible to not deal with the real 
problem of why hate crimes happen: it's not only because we don't have the 
laws down right, or don't have the "right" kind of justice system, it's because 
we keep focusing on changing our justice procedures instead of changing the 
societal conditions that create the oppression that motivates crime. We keep 
talking about how "senseless" hate crimes are, but we don't get the message 
about how warped of a reality a person can find themselves in that makes 
such crimes seem liberating. We can make laws or new procedures till the 
cows come home, but it won't stop people from hating their lives so much that 
it actually relieves some of the strain to take it out on other people. 
I began this thesis with the hope that restorative justice could offer 
some solace in the complex harm created by hate crime. It certainly made me 
feel good to practice it in my own life. I believe it can help in some cases, but 
my experience so far has been that it is set up for and is mostly helping 
members of the dominant culture, whether they be victims or offenders or 
both. Until restorative justice practitioners get a handle on the deeper issues --
102 
the reasons for injustice -- they can only do what is already being done: cover 
up the real problems by allowing people to feel like they are doing the right 
thing without really doing much at all. The fact of the matter is that solving the 
cause of hate crime is going to be very difficult, and it probably means that 
people like Claudia Brenner and you and me will have to make some 
sacrifices and step out of comfort zones we have surrounded ourselves in. 
We'll have to start reframing some of our issues, such as reframing 
"How are we going to rid the world of terrorists?" into "What is going wrong for 
these people that they are so desperate to get our attention?" We'll have to 
listen to what the racists are telling us between the lines -- like Steve Stroud's 
foster mom listened to him, unconditionally -- and hear about what the world 
looks like when you have reached the end of your rope and everyone else is 
the enemy. We'll have to stop taking credit for solutions that came without our 
help, like the moments of clarity experienced by former leaders of extremist 
movements. Sometimes it takes getting into extremely unpopular positions to 
see the light -- how can we help that happen without tripping all over our own 
principles? Perhaps we need to look more deeply at the essence of conflict to 
see what rewards it has in store for us, what we're missing by trying to kill it 
with kindness. 
This thesis has been a productive learning experience for me, though I 
certainly did not reach the conclusion I thought I would when I started. It is 
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perhaps the best thing that could have happened, because now I see those 
"deeper issues" of societal strain based on economics and power that are 
often shielded by other rhetoric. I feel like I can act on the real issues now, 
instead of wasting time on simply trying to make myself feel like I'm doing the 
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